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I. INTRODUCTION
Part one of this Article, which appeared in Volume 91, Number
2 of this Review, surveyed the West Virginia law of challenges to
jurors.
In Section II of this Part, I complete my survey of jury selection
law by canvassing voir dire procedure in West Virginia. The reader
who is not interested in learning procedural niceties but is interested
in the compelling issues raised by jury bias and prejudice would do
well to skip Section II and proceed directly to Section III.
Section III is an investigation of the interrelationship among ju-
ror characteristics, litigant characteristics, and jury decision-making.
Section IV examines the effectiveness of current voir dire practices
for dealing with what I call the silent biases and prejudices of jurors.
It is also in Section IV that I propose a revised approach to voir
dire that will bring us closer than the current system can to the ideal
of an impartial jury.'
II. THE MODE OF VoiR DmR IN WEST VIRGINIA
A. Who Questions?
Two basic modes of voir dire exist in the United States. The
first, dominant in the federal courts, makes questioning the private
reserve of the court. While attorneys may suggest questions to the
1. United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the question of when criminal defendants
are entitled to voir dire on racial questions is outside the bounds of this article. See Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28 (1986); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S.
589 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308
(1931). An excellent description of the Court's evolving position in this area up to Rosales-Lopez can




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/6
JURY SELECTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
court, 2 only the court asks questions. The other mode, under which
the judge and attorneys share the questioning, is employed chiefly
by state courts.' Consistent with this trend, many West Virginia
circuit courts allow attorney-dominated voir dire, 4 while others em-
ploy a third, hybrid type of voir dire in which the court does much
of the questioning but then allows the attorneys to pursue specific
areas. It should be noted, however, that even in those West Virginia
courts that allow lawyer questioning, such questioning is not without
limits. For reasons that will appear evident later in this paper, 5 it
is important to note that few, if any, West Virginia courts allow
lawyers to conduct individual, in-chambers voir dire of jurors absent
special circumstances and no West Virginia courts allow individual,
in-chambers voir dire as a matter of right. 6
In very few state courts is there found a right to any attorney-
conducted voir dire.7 West Virginia law, however, establishes by stat-
ute the right to some type of voir dire in civil cases. Section 56-6-
12 of the West Virginia Code provides that a party is entitled either
to voir dire the jury or to have the court voir dire the jury-the
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a) allows the court to decide in civil cases whether it or the attorneys
will conduct voir dire. If the court chooses to conduct voir dire alone, however, the rule obligates
the court to entertain questions that the attorneys ask the court to pose. W. VA. R. Cv. P. 47(a)
is identical while W. VA. R. Ciam. P. 24(a) and FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) are virtually identical.
3. Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REv. 623, 628 (1986).
Thirty-three states allow judge and attorney questioning, 5 states permit only attorneys to ques-
tion, 10 states restrict questioning to the court, and in 2 states judges decide on a court-by-court
basis. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADrmNsrA'oRs AND NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT ORGANIZATION 1987 12 map 4, 321-28 (1988).
4. Interview with Professor Franklin D. Cleckley, Professor at the W. Va. Univ. College of
Law (Aug. 8, 1989).
5. See infra, Section IV-A.
6. Cleckley, supra note 4.
7. See Tanford, supra note 3.
There is a movement afoot to guarantee lawyers the right to conduct voir dire. Senator Howell
Heflin, D-Alabama, has introduced Senate Bills 591 and 592, entitling each side's attorney to a min-
imum of thirty minutes of voir dire, with discretion in the court to expand this time as necessary.
Although hearings were held on this proposed legislation in July of 1987, no new law had been
enacted at the time of this writing. Moore, Lawyers Split Over Voir Dire Procedure, LITIGATION
NEws, Feb., 1988, at 6.
In West Virginia, the Judicial Improvement Committee of the West Virginia State Bar endorsed
this legislation in 1987 and recommended that the governing board also endorse it. The Committee
took no position on whether similar legislation should be enacted to govern West Virginia state courts.
(The author is a member of this Committee.)
1989]
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choice being in the court's discretion. 8 The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has rebuffed at least one attempt to interpret this
statute to mean that a party has the absolute right to conduct its
own voir dire. 9
WVRCP 47(a) and WVRCrP 24(a) provide that, should the court
choose to conduct the questioning, the parties are entitled to conduct
supplemental questioning or suggest additional questions10 for the
court to ask. This right to supplement, however, is greatly limited
by these same rules which give the court the discretion to allow or
accept such questioning "as it deems proper.""1 The decisional law
is in harmony with the rules, for it accords trial courts wide dis-
cretion in deciding whether to ask questions tendered by the parties.
Thus, the West Virginia Supreme Court has declined to reverse not
only in those cases in which the trial court had already adequately
covered the issues raised by the submitted supplemental questions, t2
8. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 reads, in relevant part, "Either party in any action or suit may,
and the court shall on motion of such party, examine on oath any person who is called as a juror
therein ......
9. The argument that § 56-6-12 creates a right in a party to personally conduct his or her
own voir dire examination was rejected in Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 319 (W. Va. 1983).
The Thornton court further said that W. VA. R. Crv. P. 47(a) does not create such a right.
10. It is wholly within the discretion of the court to decide whether questions shall be asked
by the lawyers and, if so, whether those questions can be asked orally by the attorneys or whether
they should instead be submitted in writing or orally to the court so that the court might then decide
whether it will ask them for the attorneys.
11. This is not to say that a court cannot abuse this discretion and be reversed on that ground.
See, e.g., State v. Peacher, 160 W. Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559 (1981). In Peacher, the court stated:
"Where a trial court's restriction of the scope of voir dire undermines the rights sought to be protected
by the voir dire process it will be held to be an abuse of discretion and reversible error." Id. at 552-
53, 280 S.E.2d at 570. The specific error in Peacher was the trial court's absolute refusal "to inquire
into any potential relationship between members of the jury panel and law enforcement agencies or
personnel." Id. at 553, 280 S.E.2d at 570. (Such relationships can give rise to a cause removal; see
Part one of this article, 91 W. VA. L. Rmv. 217 (1988-89).) The Peacher court also found error in
the trial court's refusal to "allow or conduct further inquiry into the relationships between jurors
who stated they knew the defendant or his victim so as to determine whether the juror was prejudiced
by his knowledge or relationship." Id. at 553-54, 280 S.E.2d at 570.
12. See State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 89 (V. Va. 1983) (not error for court to refuse to ask
questions proposed by defendant that were already substantially covered by the court); State v.
McFarland, 332 S.E.2d 217 (XV. Va. 1985) (not error for the trial court to refuse to ask questions
about insanity defense when the court had already substantially asked the questions). Accord, State
v. Scotchel, 168 W. Va. 545, 285 S.E.2d 384 (1981). See also State v. Wood, 352 S.E.2d 103 (W.
Va. 1986) (upholding trial court's refusal to ask tendered questions which it ruled were unrelated to
jurors' qualifications, when court had already conducted extensive voir dire and defendant had declined
an invitation to conduct individual voir dire on qualifications).
[Vol. 92
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but also in those cases in which no such questioning on those issues
by the court had taken place. 3
13. In State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944), for example, the trial court,
after it had questioned the jurors, refused to question the jurors on reasonable doubt, the presumption
of innocence, and the degree of proof. The Supreme Court of Appeals declined to find this a clear
abuse of discretion.
In State v. Wilson, 157 W. Va. 1036, 207 S.E.2d 174 (1974), the trial court refused to grant
the defendant's request that the court ask all the jurors whether they had any knowledge of the case
and from what source such knowledge was obtained. The trial court had previously asked a similar
question and saw but one affirmative response from a panel of twenty. The defendant's counsel took
issue with this perception, saying he had perceived that several jurors had attempted to answer in
the affirmative, but had not. The West Virginia Supreme Court apparently agreed with the trial court's
perception and upheld the trial court on this question, saying, however, that it would have been
"better practice to grant this request ... to remove any suspicion of a biased panel." Id. at 1043,
207 S.E.2d at 180.
The trial court also refused to ask whether the jurors were related to witnesses the state had
subpoenaed, whether the jurors thought it was more likely the defendant was guilty because the state
had indicted him, and whether the jurors would give more credibility to the testimony of police officers
than that of other witnesses. Id. With regard to the witnesses question, the relevant inquiry, according
to the Supreme Court of Appeals, was whether there were circumstances existing to create a possible
"interest in the cause." Id. at 1044, 207 S.E.2d at 180 (a disqualifying common law ground; see
Part one of this article, 91 W. VA. L. Ray. 217 (1988-89)). Finding none, the court then relied upon
W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12, saying that the "true test" was only whether the juror was related to a
party, inferring by its references to State v. Dephenbaugh, 106 W. Va. 289, 145 S.E. 634 (1928),
that relationship to a witness is irrelevant. Wilson at 1044, 207 S.E.2d at 180. This is the type of
arrogant decision that cuts off a party's right to information that would allow him or her to intel-
ligently exercise his or her peremptory challenges. For example, it might be discovered through ques-
tioning of this sort that a juror is related to a key witness. Assuming that the juror is questioned
and is not dismissed for cause or favor because he fails to admit that the relationship would influence
the credibility with which he would vest such testimony, the disfavored party would at least then
have the knowledge on which to make a decision whether to peremptorily strike the juror. State v.
Pendry, 159 W. Va. 738, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Jones v. Warden,
West Virginia Penitentiary, 161 W. Va. 168, 241 S.E.2d 914 (1978), makes this same point in a similar
context.
The Wilson court rebuffed the defendant's attack on the trial court's refusal to ask whether the
indictment made the defendant more probably guilty, saying that any error on that point would be
cured by the court's instruction on the point. 157 W. Va. at 1044, 207 S.E.2d at 180.
Finally, the court refused to find error in the trial court's refusal to ask whether the panelists
would grant police testimony added credibility, saying that the police testimony was only perfunctory
and not central to the case. Id. at 1044, 207 S.E.2d at 180.
In State v. McFarland, 332 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va. 1985), the court upheld the trial court's refusal
to ask a question, tendered by the defendant, about the panelists' views regarding theories of in-
carceration. The court reasoned that because the proffered question did not ask about the jurors'
willingness to impose particular penalties, it was improper. Id. at 228.
In State v. Wood, 352 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1986), the court upheld the trial court's refusal to
ask certain questions that the trial court deemed not related to juror qualifications but instead to
principles of law "more properly the subject of instructions at the close of evidence." Id. at 106.
5
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B. Procedures for Examining and Striking Jurors in the Typical
West Virginia Courtroom
At the beginning of trial, the jurors who previously have been
summoned to serve are seated in the spectator section of the court-
room. Kanawha County Local Rule of Court 11 describes what oc-
curs next in the typical West Virginia circuit court:
When the names of jurors upon a panel are called by the clerk each shall be
assigned consecutive numbers, beginning with the number one. Seats bearing such
consecutive numbers shall be provided in the courtroom, and, as their numbers
are thus called, the respective jurors shall take seats corresponding to the numbers
thus assigned to them, and shall occupy such seats pending the striking of the
jury.
In a civil case, approximately ten to twelve panelists are typically
called to the jury box while in a criminal case approximately twenty
to twenty-four are generally called.1 4 The panelists are then sworn."
The court proceeds to introduce the parties and their attorneys. The
court asks a number of standard questions of the panelists involving,
for example, concerns such as whether any of them have been rep-
resented by the attorneys or are related to or acquainted with the
litigants or their witnesses. Those whose answers raise questions about
their impartiality are usually questioned by the court or, alterna-
tively, by the attorneys.
In a courtroom in which lawyer questioning is allowed, the at-
torney of the party with the burden of proof then begins questioning
the panel and continues doing so until he or she makes a motion
to strike, is interrupted by an objection, or completes his or her
questioning. If a motion to strike is made, the opposing attorney
normally has at that time the opportunity to voir dire the panelist
14. These numbers are arrived at by judges by adding to the numbers of jurors who will
eventually sit the total number of peremptory strikes the parties have. Civil cases now require six
jurors while criminal cases still require twelve. See W. VA. CODE § 56-6-11 (1985). In this regard it
is interesting to note that although the size of the civil jury was reduced from twelve to six by W.
VA. CODE § 56-6-11 in 1985, the number of peremptory strikes provided to each side has remained
unchanged at four apiece. See W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966). Nonetheless, it is the practice in some
state courts to grant but two peremptory challenges to each side in civil cases, thus resulting in a
voir dire panel of ten (six plus two plus two). The author is unaware of any cases in which this
limitation on peremptory strikes, not apparently authorized by statute, has been contested.
15. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966).
[Vol, 92
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in aid of his or her possible resistance to the motion. (In a procedure
rarely employed, the opposing party at this time may also choose
to put on evidence regarding the juror's fitness. 16) After the con-
clusion of the opponent's voir dire of a contested panelist, the court,
which itself may have participated in the questioning, rules on the
motion. Should the panelist-be excused by the court as a result of
the motion to strike, a replacement is usually empaneled at that
time. The court asks the same standard questions of the replacement
and then returns control of the questioning to the attorney whose
client has the burden of proof.
After this attorney's questioning is complete, the court turns the
questioning over to the defendant's attorney. The same process is
engaged in again.
In courtrooms in which the judge does not allow lawyer ques-
tioning, the court, after asking its stock questions, may entertain
questions suggested by the attorneys, may ask some additional case-
specific questions himself or herself, or both.
When all questioning is completed and all motions to strike have
been ruled on, a list of the panelists then remaining in the box is
prepared by the clerk. Taking the list in hand, the attorney for the
party with the burden of proof lines through the name of the first
panelist the attorney wishes to peremptorily strike. The defendant's
attorney then peremptorily strikes a juror. The process continues
back and forth until each party has exhausted its peremptory strikes.
The remaining persons on the list constitute the jury that will
hear the case. 17 In the event that more jurors than are needed remain
in the box, the necessary number of jurors is typically chosen by
lot.
1. Where Does the Questioning Take Place?
Normally voir dire occurs in open court in the presence of spec-
tators, all the sworn panelists, the parties, and the remaining un-
16. Id.
17. On infrequent occasions, a need to examine a juror during trial will arise. For example,
in State v. Dye, 298 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1982), a juror who received a threatening phone call during
a criminal prosecution was subjected to the court's voir dire. (The trial court found the juror un-
prejudiced and the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to find otherwise.)
1989]
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sworn panelists. The court has the authority, however, to exercise
its discretion to conduct the voir dire of individual panelists outside
of the hearing of the remaining panelists when the court "believes
that the impartiality of the jury may be better determined in that
manner.'1
8
A court can authorize "in-chambers" 1 9 voir dire, for example,
when the panelist's answers might taint the remaining panelists who
may be ignorant of prejudicial information known by the questioned
panelist. Thus, in State v. Pendry,20 the court suggested that panelists
who had obtained information about the case from the police or
others be questioned outside of the hearing of the other panelists. 2'
18. Pendry, 159 W. Va. at 746, 227 S.E.2d at 216.
19. Although this procedure is commonly called "in-chambers" voir dire, the author is quick
to add that there is no authority in the court to exclude members of the public from the voir dire
of individual panelists. It is only the remaining panelists with whom this procedure is concerned and,
therefore, it is only they who are excluded from the questioning. Thus, this manner of voir dire often
takes place in the jury deliberation room, the court's conference room, or some other suitable place
from which the panel, but not the public, is excluded.
The United States Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S.
501 (1984), articulates the rule regarding the openness of voir dire in at least criminal proceedings:
"The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 464
U.S. at 510. One could infer from the court's reasoning that the same values implicit in openness
of criminal trials, principally public understanding of and confidence in the judicial process, would
apply with virtually equal force to civil trials as well. Indeed, it is important in this respect to recognize
that the court bottomed its decision not on the right of the defendant to a fair criminal trial under
the sixth amendment, but on the first amendment rights of the press and public. See id. at 571, n.8,
and the concurring opinions of Justices Stevens and Marshall. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578, 599 (1980) (plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger, noting that civil
trials "have been presumptively open.") (concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, noting that "ft]he
First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials ....
civil as well as criminal.")
The Press-Enterprise Court illustrated its holding, in dicta. In a rape trial (such as the underlying
prosecution in Press-Enterprise), the trial court might have to balance the interests in public trials
against the privacy interest of a panelist who "had been raped but had declined to seek prosecution
because of the embarrassment and emotional trauma from the very disclosure of the episode." Press-
Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 512. The Court then went on to say that if such a panelist were to request
some modicum of privacy in which to be questioned, the court might remove the proceedings to its
chambers, exclude the public, but allow the presence of counsel for an on-the-record voir dire. The
Court also suggested that a sanitized transcript of the proceedings in chambers could later be released
to the public.
20. 159 W. Va. 738, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976).
21. Id. at 747-48, 227 S.E.2d at 217. A fear of tainting the remaining panelists motivated the
apparent decision of the trial court to question in chambers in State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35 (W.
Va. 1983). In Bennett, the trial court was concerned with the defendant's prior conviction and learning
8
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Similarly, in Lynch v. Alderton,22 it was error for the trial court to
ask in open court, rather than in-chambers, whether any of the
panelists were insurance company employees.23
The court fashioned a specific rule in this area in State v. Finley.2
In the Finley voir dire, one juror indicated in open court that she
had served on a jury hearing a previous case against the defendant,
while a second juror publicly stated that he knew the defendant when
he had a different name. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion for a mistrial. On appeal, the supreme court found that the
information may very well have prejudiced the remaining jurors,
requiring more efforts to determine the ability of the remaining pa-
nelists to be fair. Because the trial court failed to take these steps,
the court reversed and, in doing so, articulated this rule:
When a trial court determines that prospective jurors have been exposed to
information which may be prejudicial, the trial court, upon its own motion or
motion of counsel, shall question or permit the questioning of the prospective
jurors individually, out of the presence of the other prospective jurors, to ascertain
whether the prospective jurors remain free of bias or prejudice.Y
A second type of situation in which a court might employ in-
chambers voir dire arises when the issues of the case call for the
questioning of panelists on personal and sensitive areas of their own
lives. 2
6
whether jurors were aware of it. This is the type of information that can taint a jury if the questioning
does not take place in chambers.
Compare State v. Angel, 319 S.E.2d 388 (,V. Va. 1984) (not error to fail to conduct in-chambers
voir dire when court permits individual in-court voir dire of those who hive read of defendant's prior
conviction in a newspaper story).
22. 124 W. Va. 446, 20 S.E.2d 657 (1942).
23. Id. at 450-52, 20 S.E.2d at 659-60.
24. 355 S.E.2d 47 fV. Va. 1987).
25. Id. at 51.
26. "[Slome inquiries may call for a juror to disclose information which might prove embar-
rassing if required to be given in open court. Also, information which may be revealed may serve
to taint an entire panel if given in the presence of the entire panel. Consequently, the trial court
must exercise judgment regarding the possible nature of legitimate inquiries in order to determine
when there is a need to pursue them out of the hearing of other prospective jurors." Pendry at 747,
227 S.E.2d 210, 217.
Thus, for example, in a first-degree murder prosecution in which the author assisted defense
counsel in voir dire, the court allowed the defense to conduct in chambers voir dire to determine
whether the panelists had notions or experiences regarding spouse abuse that would prejudice them
1989]
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2. Individual Voir Dire
The West Virginia cases use the phrase "individual voir dire"
in ways that are not always clear. While in many instances the term
appears to refer to the questioning of an individual panelist about
his or her particular qualifications to serve, on other occasions the
term seems to mean "in-chambers" voir dire. For the purposes of
this article, the two terms will be used to represent distinct ideas.
"In-chambers voir dire" will refer to the voir dire of a person that
takes place outside the hearing of his or her fellow panelists. 27 "In-
dividual voir dire" will refer to the questioning of an individual
panelist, usually conducted in the presence of the other panelists,
as contrasted with general questions posed to the panel as a whole.2"
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has made it clear
that individual voir dire is required under at least two circumstances:
-When there is the possibility of prejudice. State v. Pratt29 stated
the rule thusly: "Jurors who on voir dire of the panel indicate pos-
sible prejudice should be excused, or should be questioned individ-
ually either by the court or by counsel to precisely determine whether
they entertain bias or prejudice for or against either party, requiring
their excuse.''30 Later, in State v. Schrader3" the court, reflecting on
Pratt, said that "individual voir dire [is] required only when a juror
has disclosed a possible area of prejudice. ' 32 The court's use of the
against the defendant who claimed she had killed her abusive husband in self-defense. In the in
chambers voir dire that took place, one panelist admitted abusing his own spouse, an admission that
may not have been made in open court. See also Pendry, supra note 20, for the illustration provided
in Press-Enterprise that might justify the closing of voir dire to all.
Some courts routinely examine individual panelists in-chambers when the inquiry concerns the
special weight a panelist may give to the testimony of a police officer. See, e.g., State v. Archer,
169 W. Va. 564, 289 S.E.2d 178 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Pendry, 159 W. Va. at 747, 227 S.E.2d at 217.
28. See, e.g., Schrader, 302 S.E.2d 70 at 72 (V. Va. 1982).
29. State v. Pratt, 161 W. Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227, 541 syl. pt. 3 (1978).
30. Id. at 531, 244 S.E.2d at 228. See also State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981); State
v. Toney, 301 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1983); State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1988); State v.
Duncan, 369 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Deskins, 380 S.E.2d 676 (W. Va. 1989).
31. 302 S.E.2d 70 (V. Va. 1982).
32. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Accord State v. Mayle, 357 S.E.2d 219, 223 (W. Va. 1987).
Schrader was to some degree presaged by the court's language in State v. Williams, 160 W. Va. 19,
[Vol. 92
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term "disclose" is not loose language. One is entitled to individual
voir dire not as a matter of right ab initio, but only as a consequence
of another act-namely, the juror's act of disclosing information
that might possibly disqualify him or her.3 3 It appears that without
such a disclosure, a trial court might legitimately confine a party
to questions posed only to the panel as a group. Thus, in Schrader,
the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to
allow the defendant to conduct individual voir dire because there
were no signs of prejudice from any specific juror. What the court
appears to be saying is that without particular evidence that grounds
exist on which to suspect the qualifications of particular panelists
there is no basis for a request for individual voir dire.3 4
- When a party has a relationship with a member of the law
enforcement community.35 State v. Pratt36 is the textbook case il-
lustrating when individual voir dire is required. In Pratt, general
questioning of the entire panel revealed the presence of four jurors
who were kin or acquaintances of law enforcement officers. 37 The
court reversed, finding the lower court's refusal to allow individual
questioning to be an abuse of discretion." Later, in State v. Beckett39
the court spoke in even stronger terms, saying that a party has a
230 S.E.2d 742 (1976) and State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902 (NV. Va. 1982):
In Williams we held that once it was disclosed that some of the jury panel may have read
newspaper articles bearing upon the trial of the case, it was incumbent on the court to
undertake specific questions to determine whether such articles have influenced the jury....
Id. at 908.
33. The limitation thus imposed on the exercise of this right should be rejected. See the dis-
cussion in Section IV of this paper.
34. See also State v. Angel, 319 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1984). Note that Angel, however, is an
in-chambers individual voir dire case. Id. at 393.
35. This set is actually a sub-set of the broader category described above,
36. State v. Pratt, 161 W. Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978).
37. Id. at 538, 244 S.E.2d at 232. Such a relationship was determined to be grounds for cause
dismissal under State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 219, 200 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1972). For subsequent
cases modifying this rule, see Part one of this article, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 217 (1988-89).
38. Pratt, 161 W. Va. at 538-39, 244 S.E.2d at 232. See also State v. Lassiter, 354 S.E.2d 595,
599 (NV, Va. 1987). ("The determination concerning whether and the extent to which to permit in-
dividual voir dire rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and is not subject to review in
the absence of an abuse of discretion.") Compare State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902, 909 (,V. Va. 1982)
(finding that trial court did not err in retaining jurors whose qualifications had been challenged on
individual voir dire).
39. State v. Beckett, 310 S.E.2d 883 (%V. Va. 1983).
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right to individual voir dire when a panelist indicates a consangui-
neal, marital, or social relationship to a law enforcement employee.
40
Finally, in State v. Ashcraft4 the court articulated, for the first time,
a constitutional basis for the right to individual voir dire in criminal
trials when the possibility of partiality appears. 42 The court found
the source of the right in the due process guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment and the impartial trial guarantee of the sixth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, and the right to a jury trial in criminal
prosecutions guaranteed by article III, section 14 of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution.
43
It is far from clear at this point whether the court would uphold
a similar right to individual voir dire in civil cases, given the absence
of the constitutional protections on which the criminal right rests.
Surely, however, if the court is, as it often has said it is, interested
in making voir dire available as a mechanism for allowing peremp-
tory strikes to be made in an informed fashion", it will find the
denial of individual voir dire in civil cases to be an abuse of judicial
discretion, depriving a litigant of jurors free of "bias or preju-
dice." 45
III. SILENT BIASES AND PREJUDICES
A. Jury "'Selection": Theory as Prelude to Reality
Trial theory in the United States is built upon democratic ideals.
No person in a criminal or civil trial is entitled to a trial process
or result that is based on anything more or less than the facts and
the law. With respect to process, trial theory posits that it be pristine:
40. Id. at 889. See also State v. Ashcraft, 309 S.E.2d 600, 607 (W. Va. 1983); State v. Worley,
369 S.E.2d 706, 719 (V. Va. 1988); State v. Perdue, 372 S.E.2d 636, 638 (W. Va. 1988); State v.
Bates, 380 S.E.2d 203, 208 (,V. Va. 1989); State v. Bennett, slip op. 18540 (V. Va. June 15, 1989)
(Westlaw, States library, W. Va. file, p. 7).
41. State v. Ashcraft, 309 S.E.2d 600 (V. Va. 1983).
42. Id. at 609 ("[I]t is an abuse of discretion not to permit individual questioning when a juror
reveals a relationship that suggests potential for bias or prejudice.").
43. Id. at 607. See also, State v. Deaner, 334 S.E.2d 627, 629 (V. Va. 1985). In Deaner, two
panelists, in a prosecution for welfare fraud, thought welfare ought to be abolished. The Supreme
Court stated that the failure to allow individual voir dire of these panelists constituted reversible error.
44. See, e.g., West Virginia Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Tenpin Lounge, Inc., 158 W. Va. 349, 355,
211 S.E.2d 349, 353 (1974).
45. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966). See infra sections III and IV for a description of the
conditions militating in favor of individual voir dire.
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trials are to be governed by meticulously neutral procedural rules.
With respect to result, the decision-makers' minds are to be blank
slates, uninformed by preconceived ideas about the wisdom of the
applicable substantive law, and completely neutral about the liti-
gants, their witnesses, their lawyers, and about the results the parties
seek.
The theory would have the jurors, in other words, work in per-
fect, laboratory conditions. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
theory holds that the race, gender, class, even the beauty of the
litigants are, unless properly implicated by the substantive law, 46 to
count for nothing. Any intrusion of these factors into the trial proc-
ess taints and sullies the process and, perhaps, skews the result. The
intrusion confounds the bedrock democratic principle that every per-
son is entitled to the same benefits and obligations of the law.
Because the theory of trials puts irrelevant person-specific con-
siderations outside the bounds of trial, the process of jury selection
receives special attention in the theory of trials. Jury selection is the
only opportunity for the system to remove panelists who would make
decisions based on factors other than the law and the facts, in favor
of those whose decisions will be predicated upon those two factors
alone. Challenges to individual jurors are provided for no other
reason. Challenges for cause and favor are designed to deal with
the actuality or inference of juror partiality, while peremptory chal-
lenges play a similar role in eliminating suspected partiality.
Given its function, it is no surprise that voir dire is widely con-
sidered to have a significant causal relationship to the jury's ability
to rule solely on the law and facts in the jury deliberation room.
Unfortunately, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of voir dire
for achieving this goal, given the conditions under which it is now
practiced.
B. Voir Dire Law: Living in the Past-The Dead Hand of the
Law
When the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals articulated
grounds for cause challenges in the 1917 case of State v. Dushman,47
46. Such as in a suit based upon discrimination brought by a member of a protected class.
47. State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 749, 91 S.E. 809, 810 (1917).
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it relied for its authority upon a list of grounds contained in Black-
stone's Commentaries. The Commentaries, written in 1765,48 reflect
eighteenth century English society, its problems and concerns. Most
importantly, the Commentaries reflect an eighteenth century un-
derstanding of human behavior.
Since that time the social sciences have experienced some de-
velopment. In the years since the Dushman decision, tremendous
growth has taken place in sociology, psychology, economics, an-
thropology, and communication theory. In the last three decades,
psychologists in particular have been hard at work studying the re-
lationship between psychology and the legal system.
Juror behavior has been a special concern. Can the social sciences
draw the picture of the perfect juror for a litigant in advance? Can
jury decisions be explained using "small group" theory? Are there
discernible patterns in deliberations that govern who speaks and
when? What factors influence the jury's selection of its foreperson,
and whom will it most likely pick?
In an area where there are few rules restricting lawyer behavior,
some of the findings made in response to these questions have led
to changes in the way law is practiced. For example, "scientific"
jury selection (in which background research on the relevant com-
munity leads to the construction of an ideal juror profile against
which the actual jurors are squared) has become the rule rather than
the exception in important cases.
In the search for bias and prejudice on voir dire, however, the
law of jury selection has ignored what the social scientists have been
saying about jurors. For thirty years and more, psychologists and
other students of human behavior have been reporting the most
disturbing findings about juror biases and prejudices. In the face
of these findings, the legal system has neither changed its restrictive
view of favor challenges nor has it entertained alternatives to the
type of juror questioning now employed. The system is frozen to
a rigid, anachronistic model that was developed long before our
48. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries § 422.
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knowledge of human behavior was as rich as it is today. This article
is an attempt to get our West Virginia legal system to face up to
this new knowledge.
C. Living in the Present
What We Are Learning About Jurors
We are learning that a human tabula rasa is a species that exists
in trial theory but not in fact. Whether by nature or societal con-
ditioning, humans come to the courtroom with outlooks that make
them less than perfect jurors.
49
The existence of these juror characteristics, some of which are
quite undesirable, has been documented by social scientists through
experimental studies in which the attitudes of specific populations
are tested with controlled and simulated data, through case studies
in which actual jurors in a limited number of cases are interviewed,
and through archival research in which the data of numerous actual
trials are assessed. In four areas-gender, race, socioeconomic status,
and attractiveness-this research has resulted in findings that signal
trouble for our eighteenth-century view of what ought to constitute
an appropriate set of cause and favor challenges. 0
Gender
The theory of trials would hold that a litigant is entitled to the
same fair hearing whether the litigant is male or female. The result
should not be determined or even influenced by the litigant's gender
or, in a criminal case, the gender of the victim. We are learning,
however, that men and women jurors relate differently to members
of their gender group than to members of the opposite group. They
may also have different ways of looking at the evidence. In some
instances these differences might be mutually healthy and enriching.
49. See, generally, Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRD. L. AND CRIMNOLOGY
269 (1988).
50. This article does not address the bias or prejudice that may be created during a trial by
the conduct of a juror or a third party, but see Bacigal, Hearings on Juror Bias and Misconduct,
10 VA. B. A. J. 20 (1984).
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In other instances, however, it would appear that unfounded biases
and prejudices are at work.
In particular, there appears to be a same-sex identification that
occurs between jurors and parties that results in favoritism by the
juror toward the same-sex party:
*Stephan-" demonstrated in an experimental study, using a mur-
der prosecution, that "[s]ubjects were less likely to find the defen-
dant of their own sex guilty than they were to find the defendant
of the opposite sex guilty.' '52
*Falling along similar lines were the findings of Nagel and
Weitzman 53 who reviewed actual data from personal injury cases.
They found that male-dominated juries gave larger than average
awards to male plaintiffs and lower than average awards to female
plaintiffs 
4
*Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, and Bentley55 , tested prospective jurors'
and non-jurors' empathy toward rape victims. They found that
women had greater empathy for rape victims than males and that
of all women tested, those who had experienced a rape or an at-
tempted rape had more empathy than those women who had not. 6
Moreover, "subjects who indicated high levels of empathy ... ex-
pressed greater certainty that the defendant was guilty, and attrib-
uted less responsibility for the crime to the victim and greater
responsibility to the defendant than did subjects who expressed less
empathy toward the victim."
'57
51. Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 305 (1974).
52. Id., at 308. But cf., Griffit and Jackson, Simulated Jury Decisions: The Influence of Jury-
Defendant Attitude Similarity-Dissimilarity, I Soc. BEHAv. AND PERsONALrry 1 (1973); Scaly and
Cornish, Jurors and their Verdicts, 36 MOD. L. REv. 496 (1973).
53. Nagel and Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HAsnNos L. J. 171 (1971).
54. Id. at 193-196. This study was conducted using archival data from 1966. With the increas-
ingly larger percentage of women on juries the size of this disparity may have diminished or terminated
altogether. In accord with Nagel and 'Weitzman is Stephan and Tully, The Influence of Physical
Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. OF Soc. PsYCHOLOGOY 149
(1977).
55. Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, and Bentley, Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and
Rapists, 43 J. OF PERSONAI=Y AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 372 (1982) [hereinafter Deitz].
56. Id. at 379.
57. Id. at 380. The researchers' report contains the questions asked the subjects to determine
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Do men and women bring other sex-based prejudices to the jury
box? There is some evidence that they do:
*Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable.58 While Brigham
and Bothwell's experiment59 found that both sexes overestimate the
ability of eyewitnesses to identify culprits, it also found that men
do so to a greater degree than women.6°
*In a controversial experimental study of gender differences
among several hundred persons on the jury list for Yolo County,
California, Constantini, Mallery, and Yapundich 6l tested the res-
pondents' propensity to prejudge the guilt of four defendants in
actual criminal cases. Respondents were asked whether they believed
the defendants to be guilty as charged. In each case, women had
higher rates of prejudgment than men. 62 The respondents were also
asked whether they could be impartial jurors. Again, in each case
women considered themselves incapable of being impartial in higher
their levels of empathy. In a courtroom where such questions were permitted, a lawyer would find
them useful for determining attitudes on voir dire.
Other studies' findings are consistent with the work of Deitz, supra n. 55. For example, in an
experimental study, Smith, Keating, Hester, and Mitchell, Role and Justice Considerations in the
Attribution of Responsibility to a Rape Victim, 10 J. OF REs. IN PERSONATY 346 (1976), found that
males believed that rape victims are "more careless and more likely to have done something to have
provoked the rape.... Females, on the other hand, identified more strongly with the victim and
prescribed more severe punishment for the assailant than did males." Id. at 357. In another exper-
imental study, Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt and Meek, The Decision Processes of 6 and 12 Person Mock
Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. OF PERSONArY AND Soc. PsY-
CHOLOoy 1 (1975), found that "juror sex was found to be significantly associated with subjects'
perceptions of the difficulty of rape, with males generally judging rape to be more difficult than
females .... [A] powerful determinant of defendant guilt in this [rape] case may have been the sex
composition of the jury hearing the case." Id. at 40. In a third experimental study, Calhoun, Selby,
and warring, Social Perception of the Victim's Causal Role in Rape: An Exploratory Examination
of Four Factors, 29 HuMAN RELATONS 517 (1976), the researchers concluded that "male respondents
viewed a raped woman as contributing to the rape to a significantly greater degree than female
respondents." Id. at 523. Finally, Miller and Hewitt found that in an experimental study that women
convicted rape defendants at a much higher rate (65% of the time) than men (45%). Miller and
Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. OF Soc.
PsYCHoLoGY 159, 160 (1978).
58. See E. LoFrus, EYEvrrrass TESTmONY (1979).
59. Brigham and Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Examinations, 7 LAw AND HuM. BEHAv. 19, 26 (1983).
60. Id.
61. Constantini, Mallery, and Yapundich, Gender and Juror Impartiality: Are Women More
Likely to Prejudge Guilt?, 67 JUDICATURE 120 (1983).
62. Id. at 125.
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numbers than men. 63 In half of these eight comparisons, the re-
searchers' minimum level of statistical significance64 was achieved. 61
As an overlay to these gender-based prejudices, biases, and in-
clinations is the finding that men and women participate in jury
deliberations in very different ways:
*Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington66 studied the participation rates
of male and female juries in mock deliberations using actual pro-
spective jurors. They found that not only do men talk more in de-
liberations, but that men and women focus on different subjects.
Men talk more about the facts of the case, legal issues, disputed
key facts, and organizational matters than do women, while women
make more verdict statements67 than men. 6 Men are chosen to be
forepersons of the jury in frequencies disproportionately high com-
pared to their numbers in the jury population. 69 Finally, men are
viewed as more persuasive than women.
7 0
Is there any inter-play between these participation traits and the
prejudices and biases that men and women respectively hold? Logic
would answer in the affirmative, but conclusive research on this
precise question is yet to be done.7' If logic is proved correct, how-
ever, then knowledge of male and female participation patterns might
increase the lawyer's interest in particular biases and prejudices. For
example, in a rape case in which consent was a factual issue, male
bias against rape victims might take on heightened importance when
63. Id. at 126.
64. "A measurement with great statistical significance is one that is unlikely to have occurred
by chance ... ." D. BARNas, STArAsncs As PROOF 143 (1983).
65. Constantini, Mallery and Yapundich, supra note 61, at 126. The researchers admit their
findings contradict previous research. They explain this inconsistency by stating that "previous research
... generally considers verdicts rendered ... rather than measures of prejudgment." Id. at 127. This
appears to be a valid and important distinction.
66. HAsTiE, PENROD, AND PENNINGTON, INsiDE Tm Juay (1983).
67. The authors use this term to refer to "[e]xpressions advocating specific verdict positions,"
Id. at 89.
68. Id. at 142. The authors caution that while these differences exist, they may very well be
attributable to factors other than gender, such as occupation, education, etc.
69. Marden, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L. Rav. 593, 595 n. 9 (1987).
70. HAsTrE, PENROD, AND PENNINGTON, supra note 66, at 145.
71. Some research, with conflicting results, has been performed in this area. See Marden, supra
note 69, at 596 n. 17.
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viewed against the over-participation by males in deliberations over
disputed key facts.
Socioeconomic Status
According to trial theory, no person is above the law. The rhet-
oric supporting this principle is especially strong in the criminal area.
The results of extensive psychological studies indicate, however, that
some persons may be treated more or less favorably by jurors be-
cause of their status in society, because of the jurors' status, or
both. 72 So powerful is socioeconomic bias that Professor Freda Adler
describes it as-
... the bias which appears to be the most important single extra-legal factor
associated with juror deliberations .... In our stratification system individuals
are perceived by each other as occupying a position in a power-prestige hierarchy.
Furthermore, this stratification generally coincides in our modern industrial society
with the division of labor. Even in a society with a fluid class system, values are
not homogeneous; the position a person occupies influences his values and has
a profound influence on his understanding of, and judgment toward, people of
other ranks. 71
*Adler's remarks are found in her report74 of her study of the
occupations of actual defendants and jurors in 100 Pennsylvania
state court criminal cases. She found that "discrepancy in occu-
pational status between juror and defendant is related to trial out-
come. High discrepancy between defendant and jurors is more likely
to lead to conviction than a trial situation in which low discrepancy
occurs, This relationship holds under various configurations of oc-
cupational level among jurors and defendants. ' 75
*Although factors other than socioeconomic prejudices of jurors
may certainly be at work, it is nonetheless not surprising in light
of Adler's findings that Nagel,76 in a study of thousands of actual
72. "The bulk of the trial data demonstrates socioeconomic discrimination in the criminal jury
trial." Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants, in TnE JuRY Sys Mu iN AbaRucA
106, 107 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
73. Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. Rsv. oF L. AND Soc.
CHANGE 1, 4 (1973).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL. PRocEss FROM A BEHAvroRAL PERSPECTIVE (1969).
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federal and state court jury decisions, found that 85 to 90% of
indigent criminal defendants were found guilty "in contrast to con-
sistently lower percentages for the non-indigent .... ,1 Jurors are
not, as a class, indigent.
*Vivid illustrations of the role played by socioeconomic status
in actual juror decision-making are given in Broeder, Occupational
Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary
Look.78 For example, in one civil case studied by Broeder, upper
class jurors favored the corporate defendant, while the working class
jurors favored the plaintiff, a laborer. Of the eight jurors favoring
the worker, six were themselves workers. Broeder comments that
"occupational bias was the central characteristic of the . .. delib-
erations and of the thinking of the ... jurors with regard to the
case." 79
*Reed 8° questioned 158 persons who sat on 36 actual civil and
criminal trials. He found that in a criminal trial "the higher the
status of the individual juror the more likely he was to vote guilty;
the lower the status of the individual juror the more likely he was
to vote not guilty." 81 Reed also reported that "[p]etit jurors also
differentially treated persons accused of a crime. Persons with high
occupational status were much more frequently held not guilty than
their low socioeconomic counterparts.
'82
77. Id. at 90. Nagel did not specifically locate the source of this disparity in juror prejudice.
Stephan, in commenting on the study on which Nagel drew his data, Silverstein, Defense of the Poor
in Criminal Cases in American State Courts (1965), and on other studies, reviews the disadvantages
under which indigent criminal defendants labor. Stephan, supra note 72, at 102, 107.
78. 40 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1079 (1965). Broeder was a researcher in the famous University of
Chicago Jury Project. See Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School, 23 INs. CouN. J. 368 (1957).
79. Id. at 1090. This example is also cited by Adler, supra note 73.
80. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 45 SoUTHWEsTERN Soc. Smi. Q. 361
(1965).
81. Id. at 366.
82. Id. But cf. Bray, Struckman-Osborne, McFarlane, and Scott, The Effects of Defendant
Status on the Decisions of Student and Community Juries, 41 Soc. PSYCHOLooY 256 (1978).
A more recent study similar to Reed's was conducted in 1988 by C. Walter for the Roscoe Pound
Foundation and reported in J. GUtrNrMR, THE JURY IN AmzRiCA (1988). Persons who had served as
actual jurors in three state and federal courts in Pennsylvania between January 28, 1985 and January
31, 1986 were surveyed post-trial with close to a 100% response rate. Id. at 289-90. Walter found
in civil cases that "[j]uries which decided in favor of the defendant contained more jurors who had
[Vol. 92
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/6
JURY SELECTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
*In a jury simulation study a similar pattern was found.
Frederick 3 reported that mock jurors convicted defendants of low
socioeconomic status more frequently than they convicted high status
defendants.8 4 Consistent with these findings were those reported by
Foley, Chamblin, and FortenberryY These researchers determined
that subjects who viewed the defendants' socioeconomic status as
high rated such defendants as less guilty. Moreover, there was also
found to be a relationship between the socioeconomic status of the
jurors and their evaluations of the defendants' guilt.
8 6
*Reed's archival finding that the higher the status of the juror,
the more likely the juror is to vote to convict finds support in the
experimental study conducted by Simon. 7 Simon condensed the
transcripts of actual trials, had them recorded, and played them to
persons from actual jury pools. She found that in prosecutions for
housebreaking and incest, when a verdict-status relationship was
found, "it always supported the expectations that ... lower status
jurors are more likely to favor the defendant." 9
completed some or all of college. Juries which decided in favor of the plaintiff were comprised of
more jurors with less formal education." Id. at 353. Walter reports that these differences are to a
"nearly statistically significant degree.. . ." Id. Walter concludes that "It]here appears to be a re-
lationship between education and verdict." Id. at 343. (While Walter also reported that jurors with
professional or graduate education split evenly between plaintiff and defendant juries, she does not
explain the discrepancy; one might suspect that the number of such persons appearing on juries was
relatively insignificant.)
83. Frederick, The Effects of Decision Alternatives, Participant's Respectability, and Sex of
Subject on Decisions Reached by Simulated Juries: A Comparison Between Two Populations, paper
presented at the Southeastern Psychological Association Convention, Atlanta, Ga., 1978, cited in J.
FREDEIUCK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AmERICAN JuRY 242, n. 4 (1987).
84. Id. at 242. Despite his own study, Frederick states that the effect of socioeconomic status
is not clear. Id. Dane and Wrightsman, however, counter that while "the effects of socioeconomics
may be complex" that "does not mean that socioeconomic status should be written off as having
no influence .... " Dane and Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on
Jurors Verdicts in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRoo?, 83, 95 (N. Kerr and R. Bray, eds.) (1982).
85. L. Foley, M. Chamblin, and J. Fortenberry, The Effects of Race, Socioeconomic Status,
and Personality Variables on Jury Decisions (paper presented to American Psychological Association,
Sept., 1979), cited in Dane and Wrightsman, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIM CouRTRooM, supra note 84,
at 93.
86. Id.
87. R. SRioN, THE JuRY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 112.
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Race
One pattern that emerges at this point is this: jurors tend to
identify with those who resemble them in some significant way.9 0
Thus, women tend to identify with women; men tend to identify
with men; members of a certain socioeconomic class tend to identify
with other members of that class. The archival, case study, and
experimental evidence indicates that the pattern holds for race, too.
Recent psychological experiments have resulted in findings that
indicate white jurors are "more likely to find a minority-race de-
fendant guilty than they [are] to find an identically situated white
defendant guilty": 91
*Miller and Hewitt92 tested the proposition that "a jury would
be more likely to convict a defendant accused of rape when the
victim and the jurors" were of the same race93 by garnering the
reactions of black and white subjects to a videotape of part of an
actual trial and to written summaries of the balance of the case.
The results were startling in their magnitude: black jurors voted for
conviction 80% of the time when the victim was black whereas they
voted for conviction only 48 0 of the time when the victim was
white. Similarly, white jurors convicted defendants who had raped
white victims at a 650%0 rate, while defendants who had raped black
victims were convicted at only a 32°%o rate. 94
90. "[A]ttraction toward other people is influenced by the degree of attitudinal similarity....
similarity of belief systems .... perceived racial identity .... ideological similarity... and the at-
tractiveness of the victim and the defendant. . . ." Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror
Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOc. PSYCHOLOOY 133, 134 (citations
omitted) (1979). But cf. Byrne and Wong, Racial Prejudice, Interpersonal Attraction, and Assumed
Dissimilarity of Attitudes, 65 J. op ABNORAL PSYCHOLOGY 246 (1962) (finding more tolerance of
persons who are racially dissimilar with dissimilar attitudes than of racially similar persons with dis-
similar attitudes).
91. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. R-v. 1611, 1626 (1985). Many
of the race studies reported here are described in greater detail in Professor Johnson's excellent article.
Professor Johnson also reports on a few studies, not described here, which "fail to find a direct
cause and effect relationship between the race of the defendant and guilt attribution." Id. at 1631.
92. Miller and Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Sim-
ilarity, 105 J. OF SOc. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1978).
93. Id. at 159. The race of the defendant was black. Id. at 160.
94. Id. at 160.
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*McGlynn, Megas, and Benson conducted an experimental study95
to determine whether "blacks would be judged more severely than
whites" by white mock jurors in a case in which insanity was the
defense. 96 These researchers found that black males were adjudged
to be guilty more frequently than white male defendants and black
females more frequently than white female defendants. 97 They con-
clude that "race . . . may influence decisions in cases in which a
plea of insanity is entered" and that "the results provide some sup-
port for the hypothes[i]s of prejudicial treatment of ... blacks. "98
*Feild99 suggests that the theory advanced by Brownmiller1°°-
that the discriminatory treatment of black rape defendants results
from white jurors wanting to safeguard white women from black
men' 01-is correct. In Feild's experimental study, black defendants
were treated more harshly when the victim was white than when
they were black. 102
*Ugwuegbuo3 conducted an experimental study of the attitudes
of whites and blacks toward a simulated case of aggravated and
forcible rape. All his subjects met the legal requirements for jury
duty in the state of Ohio. Ugwuegbu found that black and white
jurors alike evaluated racially dissimilar defendants more harshly
than racially similar defendants. He also found that when the victim
of the rape was racially similar to the juror, the juror had a greater
affect for the victim than otherwise and more feelings of punitiveness
toward the defendant? °4 Ugwuegbu also found that when the victim
95. McGlynn, Megas, and Benson, Sex and Race as Factors Affecting Attribution of Insanity
in a Murder Trial, 93 J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1976).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 96. See Table I and accompanying text at 96.
The researchers also found that, on sentencing, blacks were not treated more harshly than whites.
They suggest that this result might be caused by juror feelings that blacks are not as responsible as
whites. McGlynn, Megas, and Benson, supra note 95, at 99.
98. Id. at 97.
99. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions, 3 LAW AND Hum. BEHAV. 261 (1979).
100. Brownmiller, AGAINST OUR WVILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
101. Feild, supra note 99, at 278-279.
102. Id.
103. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15
J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1979).
104. In an important finding, Ugwuegbu also learned that "[w]hen the evidence is ambiguous,
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is racially similar, interracial rape is punished more severely than
intraracial rape. 105
*In a fairly sophisticated experimental study designed to deter-
mine levels of pretrial guilt probabilities, Klein and Creech'06 found
that white mock jurors in burglary, rape, and murder prosecutions
believed that defendants charged with victimizing black women were
a priori less guilty than defendants charged with victimizing white
women. 07 They also found that when presented with neutral evi-
dence, tailored by the researchers to favor neither the prosecution
nor the defense, white jurors interpreted the evidence more favorably
to the prosecution when the victim was white than when the victim
was black. 108 Klein and Creech conclude from these findings that
white jurors are biased in favor of white victims'09 and that "the
white victim receives preferential consideration in all stages of the
decision process."110
*In an experimental study under realistic conditions, Bernard"'
conducted mock jury trials and deliberations. Bernard found a
"highly significant difference" in the treatment afforded white and
black defendants." 2 Black defendants were convicted at a greater
rate under otherwise identical fact situations.13
Case studies of jury deliberations and archival research confirm
these experimental results:
the difference in punitiveness between racially similar and racially dissimilar defendants will be es-
pecially strong." Id. at 135. Ugwuegbu's finding is consistent with the "liberation theory" described
by Kalven and Zeisel. H. KALWvN "D H. ZEISEL, THE AmmucAN Jui-y (1966). See text accompanying
footnote 168 (Kalven and Zeisel liberation theory).
105. Ugwuegbu, supra note 103, at 139.
106. Klein and Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes,
3 BASIC AND APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1982).
107. Id. at 24. "For each crime, the race of the male defendant and the female victim were
also varied .... Id. at 23. "[Tjests of interactions between crime type and race of the victims and
race of the defendants were not conducted." Id. at 24.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 25, 27.
110. Id. at 30.
111. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of Jurors in Determining
Verdicts, 5 LAN & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 103 (1979).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/6
JURY SELECTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
*Professor Dale Broeder studied all the jury trials conducted in
an unnamed Northern state's United States District Court for a year-
and-a-half in the mid-fifties. 1 14 One section of his study focused on
criminal cases in-which blacks were defendants."1 5 His extensive post-
trial interviews with the jurors who sat in judgment of these blacks
revealed overt, openly-acknowledged racism to a shocking extent.
Some jurors had argued that a defendant ought to be convicted
solely because he was black." 6 One juror stated: "Niggers have to
be taught to behave. I felt that if he hadn't done that, he'd done
something else probably even worse and that he should be put out
of the way for a good long while.""1
7
Broeder further reported that his interviews were filled with
phrases such as "dirty jig" and "damn nigger." ' s Many jurors ar-
ticulated fear of inter-racial marriage." 9
*Racial prejudice was reported in Kalven and Zeisel's now fa-
mous, ground-breaking report on juries, The American Jury. 2" Rather
than interviewing jurors, as Broeder had done, they interviewed judges
in order to isolate the causes of judge-jury differences in jury trial
results.12' Professor Sheri Johnson summarizes the findings:
.. the race of the defendant affected jury deliberations in three ways. First, in
only twenty-two cases did the jury vote to convict when the judge would have
acquitted; in four of these cases, the judge saw substantial evidentiary problems
and explained the jury's verdict as prompted by the jurors' antagonism toward
the defendant's involvement in interracial sex. Second, the juries tended toward
undue leniency in black defendant/black victim assault cases. Third, although
judges thought that jurors often acquitted guilty defendants out of sympathy for
the particular defendant .... black defendants were much less likely than white
defendants to be the recipients of such leniency because they were viewed as
extremely unsympathetic.-
114. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DuIKE L.J. 19.
115. Id. at 21-22.
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 24.
119. Id.
120. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, TnE AMwacA JURY (1966).
121. Id.
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Archival research findings confirm the experimental studies and
the case studies:
*Gerard and Terry212 determined that in Missouri state courts
black defendants were convicted far more often than whites.'24 In
another study covering all persons indicted for first degree murder
over a six-year period in a number of Florida counties, Foley found
that blacks were convicted in significantly higher proportions than
whites.1 25
*Chin and Peterson, 26 after studying twenty years' worth of civil
jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, concluded that "[Il]itigants'
race seemed to have a pervasive influence on the outcomes.... ,,127
Black plaintiffs won, as a percentage, less often than white plaintiffs.
When black plaintiffs did win, their awards were only seventy-four
percent of the average award to white plaintiffs for the same injury.
As defendants, blacks also fared poorly, losing more often than
white defendants. When blacks and whites sued each other the dif-
ferences in result were marked, with white plaintiffs doing much
better against black defendants than black plaintiffs against white
defendants: "White plaintiffs, for example, won sixty-two percent
of slip and fall trials against blacks defendants, but black plaintiffs
won only fifty percent of such suits against white defendants."' 28
Attractiveness
Should jurors base their judgment of a party, even in part, upon
the party's physical attractiveness? Trial theory holds, of course,
that attractiveness is an extra-legal factor and that a jury decision
123. Gerard & Terry, Discrimination Against Negroes in the Administration of Criminal Law
in Missouri, 70 WAsH. U.L.Q. 415 (1970).
124. Id. at 430-31.
125. L. Foley, The Effect of Race on the Imposition of the Death Penalty (Sept. 1979) (un-
published paper presented at a meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York),
cited in Johnson, supra note 122, at 1621.
126. Chin and Peterson, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY
TuAis (1985).
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must be based solely on the law and the evidence. 129 Yet what does
the evidence demonstrate about the choices jurors make?
*Sannito and Arnolds 30 questioned hundreds of persons across
the country who had served on actual jury trials. They found a
significant relationship in criminal cases between the attractiveness
of the defendant and the jurors' verdicts.' 3' "When jurors were es-
thetically impressed, they were more prone to acquit; the more their
eyes were offended, the greater was their tendency to convict.'1
32
*Kulka and Kessler'33 allowed mock jurors to experience a mock
trial via a coordinated audio tape and slide presentation in which
the subject matter was an automobile accident. They varied the at-
tractiveness of the plaintiff and defendant and found that mock
jurors "exposed to an attractive plaintiff and an unattractive de-
fendant . . . would be more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff
than those exposed to an unattractive plaintiff and an attractive
defendant . . . . "'s" Moreover, attractive plaintiffs were awarded
higher damages than unattractive plaintiffs. 13 The researchers con-
cluded that their research identified "a tendency in society to value
physically attractive persons more highly than those who are phys-
ically unattractive." 3 6
*Efran,13" in another less sophisticated study, found that jurors
felt less certain of the guilt of physically attractive defendants of
either gender and meted out milder punishment to them than to
unattractive defendants. 138 One aspect of Efran's study has special
129. "If justice were indeed blind, the physical attractiveness of a plaintiff or a defendant should
be irrelevant to any decisions made by a jury." Kulka & Kessler, Is Justice Really Blind?-The
Influence of Litigant Physical Attractiveness on Juridical Judgment, 8 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
366, 377 (1978).
130. Sannito & Arnolds, Jury Study Results: The Factors at Work, 5 TRrAL DPLomAcY J. 6
(Spring 1982).
131. Id. at 9.
132. Id.
133. Kulka & Kessler, supra note 129.
134. Id. at 373.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal At-
traction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. Rs. PmsomAuir
45 (1974).
138. Id. at 49. Efran found this effect to be strong in the men he tested, but not in the women.
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implications for voir dire: prior to their being tested, the subjects
had overwhelmingly rejected attractiveness as an appropriate factor
in the decision-making process.1 9
*Stephan and Tully' 4° conducted an experimental study in which
they found mock jurors in a personal injury case favored attractive
plaintiffs with their verdicts significantly more frequently than un-
attractive plaintiffs. The jurors also awarded significantly more dam-
ages to the attractive plaintiffs than to unattractive ones. 41
*This disturbing evidence that humans favor those who are at-
tractive over those who are not appears to exist outside the jury box
and in the roots of our culture. Dion 142 found that adults viewed
a child's misbehavior as less serious when the child was attractive.
In particular, a transgression committed by an unattractive child will
result in an onlooking adult assigning higher levels of dishonesty
and unpleasantness to the child than if the child were attractive. In
a comment laden with import for the present discussion about juror
behavior, Dion notes that "[i]f the unattractive child is seen as more
likely to lie than an attractive child, establishment of his [or her]
innocence may not be as easy. ''143
Criticisms of Using Psychological Data
Lawyers and others have a tendency to believe that psychological
findings have an immediate and unmediated application in the court-
room. Were life so simple. In fact, the psychological data reported
here should not be uncritically embraced. But neither should it be
taken lightly. A brief review of the problem of generalizing from
psychological theory to legal practice is in order. 144
139. Only 7% of the mock jurors believed that attractiveness should affect judicial decisions.
Efran, supra note 137, at 49.
140. Stephan & Tully, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the Decisions
of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOOY 149 (1977).
141. Id. at 150.
142. Dion, Physical Attractiveness and Evaluation of Children's Transgressions, 24 J. PERSON-
AITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1972).
143. Id. at 212.
144. In the psychological literature this problem is known as the problem of "external validity."
The external validity of a study "refers to the degree to which the findings or results of research in
one setting, such as a laboratory experiment, can be generalized to another setting, such as an actual
courtroom." HAsrn!, PENROD, & PENNINGTON, INSIDE Tm JURY 38 (1983).
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Critics have pointed to a number of features of experimental
studies to support their claims that the results of such studies should
be approached cautiously:
-In many of the studies the subjects did not deliberate. Instead,
they were often simply questioned as individuals, without any
interaction among themselves. Interaction is important, the ar-
gument goes, because jurors' biases balance each other out and
because minds change as a result of discussion.
-Without the formalities of the courtroom-its solemnity, the
oath, etc.-subjects are apt to take a psychologist's study less
seriously than an actual jury deliberation.
145
-The subjects of the studies often do not resemble actual jurors
and therefore do not reflect typical characteristics of the juror
population. 146 Many of the studies, for example, are conducted
using college students exclusively.
-The experimental studies involve unrealistic simulations of jury
trials. The "trial" experienced by the mock jurors is sometimes
substantially unlike the trial experienced by actual jurors. For
example, subjects sometimes receive nothing but brief written
summaries of "trials" on which to base their individual reac-
tions. 47 Moreover, the written summaries may unnaturally em-
phasize the extra-legal elements to be tested 48 and de-emphasize
proper evidence. 49 By contrast, actual jurors receive information
at trial in an integrated, holistic and perhaps more balanced way.
The problem of external validity is a real one. The criticisms
leveled against experimental studies are not without foundation.
5 0
145. Id. at 41.
146. See Bray and Kerr, Methodological Consideration in the Study of Psychology in the Court-
room, in PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRooM 287, 308 (1982).
147. An example of this criticism can be found at Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of
the Defendant and That of the Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY Ray. 103,
104-05 (1979). See also Bray & Kerr, supra note 146, at 306-07.
148. HAsna, PENtROD, & PENNiNGToN, supra note 144, at 41.
149. "[Aln attempt is often made to keep the evidence weak or ambiguous in experiments to
assure maximum sensitivity to the manipulation's effect." Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials Through
Science: A Defense of Lawyer-Psychologist Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REv. 741, 755 (1988).
150. For more detailed expositions of this argument, see Bermant, McGuire, McKinley and Salo,
The Logic of Simulation in Jury Research, 1 CUm. JusT. & BEHAV. 224 (1974); Davis, Bray, and
Holt, Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries, LAW, JusicE, AND THE INDrvmJAL IN Socm-r
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Upon careful analysis, however, the argument against taking ex-
perimental results seriously must fail.
Implicit in the criticisms of experimental studies is the notion
that the best way to draw deductions about juror behavior is to
study the workings of actual juries. There are, however, two prob-
lems with this approach. The first is that it is improper to eavesdrop
on jury deliberations. In 1954, University of Chicago researchers,
using hidden microphones, taped the deliberations of juries in five
cases in a federal district court in Kansas, unbeknownst to their
subjects, but with the assent of the presiding judge. Not only were
the researchers roundly criticized,15' but their methodology was
promptly proscribed by Congress. 1
52
The second problem with the study of actual juries is the dif-
ficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining internal validity in such
studies. Internal validity "refers to the degree to which changes in
the measured dependent variables can be attributed to the manip-
ulated variables. 1 5 3 In an experimental study, the researcher can
study the effect of a factor, such as racial bias, by holding all other
factors constant and manipulating the isolated racial factor only.
While this procedure might put added and perhaps unrealistic em-
phasis on the factor being tested, it does allow for a clear obser-
vation of the effect of race on decision-making. It is impossible to
construct such conditions in field research. Not only is every actual
trial different from every other trial, thus making it impossible to
compare effects under otherwise identical conditions, but it is im-
326 (1977); Weiten and Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm, 3 LAW &
HuM. BmrAv. 71 (1979); and Vidmar, The Other Issues in Jury Simulation Research, 3 LAW & HuMAN
BEHIv. 95 (1979). See also, Colasanto and Sanders, Methodological Issues in Simulated Jury Research
(unpublished revision of a paper delivered in 1978 to a meeting of the Law and Society Association).
The Colasanto-Sanders paper, as well as some of the other authorities mentioned here, are described
in some detail in Wasserman and Robinson, Extra-Legal Influences, Group Processes, and Jury De-
cision-Making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 96 (1980). See Strodtbeck, Social
Process, the Law, and Jury Functioning, (Evan ed. 1972); LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 144, 151 n. 8 (1962).
For a response to many of these criticisms, see Bray & Kerr, supra note 146.
151. See Strodtbeck, supra note 150.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982). The author is unaware of any similar West Virginia statute.
Eavesdropping in West Virginia, however, like eavesdropping in other jurisdictions, would certainly
not be tolerated and would surely be punished through the court's contempt powers.
153. Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, supra note 144 at 38.
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possible to control, limit, and clearly observe the input of infor-
mation the jurors are receiving. As a result of the illegality of
eavesdropping and the difficult, if not impossible, conditions under
which systematic field research would have to be conducted, the use
of actual jury trials is limited to case studies and statistical analyses.
All other knowledge must come from experimental studies.
This lack of choice, however, does not mean that researchers
have been insensitive to the criticisms advanced against the condi-
tions under which their experiments have been conducted. Research-
ers have employed non-student subjects and constructed more realistic
test conditions and materials. 54 While it is true that some of the
data described above come from experiments employing students,
the attacks made upon the use of students as subjects have been
largely discredited. 155
Moreover, some of the doubts created by the methodology em-
ployed in experimental studies have been greatly -lessened, if not
removed entirely, by the confirmation those studies received in case
studies or in the statistical analyses performed on the results of ac-
tual trials. This pattern is particularly strong in the areas of race,
socioeconomics, and gender.Y
6
With respect to the charge that deliberations are not built into
experimental simulations, one must admit this to often be the case.
The significance of this departure from reality is questionable, how-
ever. Deliberations are alleged to be important because jurors have
154. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 149.
155. Researchers who have compared the use of students as against non-student adults have
found "little or no difference in comparisons of verdicts by student and adult jury-eligible respondents
in the same cases." MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 Sci. 1046 (1989).
Ugwuegbu offers an interesting defense to the criticisms of the use of college students as subjects.
"[There is no strong a priori reason to believe that real jurors would be able to set aside these biases,
especially if the jurors are less sophisticated than university students." Ugwuegbu, supra note 103,
at 144-45.
156. See, e.g., supra note 53-54, 69, 73, 76, 78, 80-81, 83, 85. These studies indicate that men
give women unfairly low personal injury awards, that the greater the socioeconomic distance between
jurors and defendants the greater the likelihood of conviction, and that whites give blacks unfairly
low personal injury awards and give them verdicts less often than they give white plaintiffs verdicts.
Insofar as it is possible for a body of studies to be self-confirming, it should be also noted that
the weight of the experimental studies favor the conclusions reached in this article. As in all the social
sciences, there is not unanimity.
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the opportunity to counter each other's biases and prejudices. The
critics argue that experimental studies, by omitting deliberations, are
fatally flawed because the actual system cleanses the jurors of bias.
This is a ridiculous position. 15 7 If that were the case across the board,
then how do the critics explain the studies of actual trial data that
report men disfavoring female personal injury plaintiffs, and whites
disfavoring black personal injury plaintiffs? How do the critics ex-
plain the tendency, observed in actual trials, of upper-class persons
to convict lower-class persons? The critics, moreover, are wrong in
their assumptions on yet another basis. Their criticism rests on the
notion that a jury represents a fair cross-section of the community
such that there is a balancing of biases and counter-biases. It has
been long recognized, however, that the jury, as a fair cross-section
of the community, exists in constitutional theory only. Take West
Virginia juries, for example. To begin with, civil juries have been
cut down to six persons in number. The smaller the jury, the less
likely it is to represent minority interests. 158 It is inevitable, therefore,
that such small juries would have within them a less well-balanced
mix of biases and counter-biases. Even more important than this is
the fact that less than perfect West Virginia juries are pre-ordained.
One of the principal sources from which we draw our jurors is the
voter registration list. Such lists are widely recognized as being un-
representative of the community. 159
A third response to the criticism regarding lack of deliberations
is that actual jurors are questioned prior to deliberations. It is pre-
cisely their pre-deliberation state with which we are concerned. The
very purpose of voir dire is to root out bias and prejudice before
157. There is no "assurance that deliberation will consistently reduce bias.. . ." Wasserman &
Robinson, supra note 150, at 135. Indeed, some "studies with very close cases show sustained or
even enhanced bias after deliberation." MacCoun, supra note 155 at 1048.
158. "[R]udimentary sampling theory indicates that a smaller jury will be less representative of
minority interests in the community." MacCoun, supra note 155 at 1048.
159. See, DiSalvo, The Key-Man System for Composing Jury Lists in West Virginia-The Story
of Abuse, The Case for Reform, 87 W. VA. L. Ray. 219 app. A at 257-59 (1984-5). W. VA. CODE
§ 52-1-5 (1988) requires the use of at least two source lists for the compilation of the master list
from which jurors are summoned: (1) lists of persons who pay state income tax; (2) persons who
hold drivers' licenses; and (3) lists of registered voters.
Almost all counties avoid the use of taxpayer lists. Most merge driver and voter lists in ways
that give undue emphasis to voter lists, the less representative of the two lists.
[Vol. 92
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they get to the deliberation room. Experimental studies, therefore
are useful for telling us what is going on in the minds of actual
members of a jury panel.
A final comment with respect to this criticism concerns the be-
havior of actual jurors. Since the early research done by Kalven and
Zeisel,' 6° it has been acknowledged that "with very few exceptions
the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict .. ."161 If this
is so, then the initial feelings of the juror-including the juror's
biases and prejudices-may count more heavily than the delibera-
tions that follow. 162 Experimental studies that sample the juror's pro-
clivities before deliberation possess importance from this
standpoint.163
For all these reasons, the criticism that experimental studies should
include deliberations is hardly a conclusive argument against the use
of experimental data.
Finally, no claim is made here that there is a one-to-one rela-
tionship between experimental results and actual courtroom behav-
ior. Such a claim would be naive and foolish. Trial lawyers know
there is a multitude of reasons for a jury's decision-the strength
of the evidence, the quality of the trial lawyers, the strategies they
employ, the individual experiences of the jurors, their choice of fo-
reperson, the instructions of the court, the politics of the time-the
list is virtually endless. Because there are many factors that make
up a jury's decision, however, is no reason to deny what the psy-
chological studies are telling us-that human beings have particular
biases. These biases and prejudices constitute one of the factors that
160. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE A icAN JuRy (1966).
161. Id. at 488. For a review of the work done since the time of Kalven and Zeisel, offering
different models for explaining this phenomenon, cf. MacCoun, supra note 155 at 1047-48.
162. There is no intention on the part of the author to state here that deliberations are an
exercise in futility. The question of the relationship between deliberations and outcome is a complex
one and is outside the scope of this article. For in-depth discussion of the subject see s. PENROD,
R. HASTm & N. PENNiNG'ToN supra note 144; Wasserman and Robinson, supra note 157.
163. This is not to deny that juries often deliberate before taking a first vote.
While there are some reports that deliberations reduce the impact of extra-legal factors, it is
apparent deliberations do not remove them completely. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions, 3
L. & Hum. BEHAV. 261, 281 (1979).
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play into a jury's decision, especially in cases in which the evidence
is ambiguous. 164 Bray and Kerr put the point this way:
w.. e are not persuaded that simulation studies must accurately estimate the
strength of an effect or that the effects must account for large amounts of var-
iability in the behavior of actual courtroom actors in order to be useful. If our
interest is exclusively predictive, weak effects may not be terribly useful. But if
our interest extends to the ability of courtroom participants to carry out their
responsibilities, even small or infrequently applied biases may be important, par-
ticularly when they are based on extralegal factors or might be remedied through
minor procedural safeguards. Nor is it essential that an experimental treatment
in a simulation study accurately mirror the range in variation or prominence of
the independent variable in "typical" trials. In this regard, one might draw an
analogy between strong manipulations in simulations and feeding massive doses
of a substance to laboratory rats to determine possible carcinogenic effects of
that substance. Even if saccharine is not a major cause of human bladder cancer,
demonstrating that massive saccharine doses reliably lead to bladder cancers in
rats can alert us to possible risks and can guide future research. Demonstrations
that artificially powerful treatments reliably affect courtroom behavior can serve
similarly valuable functions."63
There is no one-to-one relationship between a demographic char-
acteristic and the behavior of a particular juror in a particular case.
Whether a juror's biases and prejudices affect the jury's decision
"depends in complicated ways on the details of a specific case.' ' 166
Wasserman and Robinson offer no fewer than five possible ways
in which "extra-legal factors" can enter into the decision-making
process. In ascending order of subtlety, they are:
164. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
165. Kerr and Bray, supra note 146, at 317.
MacCoun puts it somewhat differently: "When the objective is to precisely estimate the magnitude
of the relations among variables in actual jury trials, the archival method is more appropriate. The
role of mock jury experimentation is to explain the processes underlying those relations." MacCoun,
supra note 155 at 1046.
166. S. KAssn. & L. WmorH2s m, Ti Am~mcAN JURY ON TRIAL, 29 (1988). The authors give
an example:
In one study, for example, Rita Simon had people listen to a recorded simulation of a
criminal trial involving either a breaking-and-entering or an incest charge. In both cases
the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. She found that compared to their
male counterparts, female jurors were more lenient toward the housebreaking defendant
but harsher toward the accused in the incest case. That kind of interaction is more the rule
than the exception in the relationship between juror demographics and verdicts.
See also Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries, in LAW, JusTica
AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SocIETY 327-33 (1977).
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- . the factor may be explicitly considered and treated as having probative
value just as any other item of evidence
-The extra legal factor may affect the standard of proof
-The extra-legal factor may "slide into" a legitimate consideration that provides
the basis or pretext for its consideration
-By causing the decision-maker to favor one side, the extra-legal factor may
motivate [the juror] to emphasize the evidence favoring that side
-The extra-legal factor may so dispose the fact-finder toward one side of the
case that makes the evidence for that side appear much stronger" 67
In an earlier era of research, Kalven and Zeisel took a simpler
but similar approach in constructing their "liberation hypothesis":
[There is] a central proposition about jury decision-making, what we shall call
the liberation hypothesis .... [In one category of cases], there is an evidentiary
difficulty to which the jury may be responding and there is also a sentiment or
value to which it may be responding. Would the jury have responded to one
stimulus without the impact of the other? ... The sentiment gives direction to
the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable condition for
a response to the sentiment. The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for
the jury to respond to sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evi-
dence....
The point here is fundamental to the understanding of jury psychology and jury
process. We know ... that the jury does not often consciously and explicitly
yield to sentiment in the process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The jury,
therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law within the etiquette of re-
solving issues of fact."'
The interactions that produce jury verdicts are complex. Com-
plexity, however, should not blind us to the presence of factors we
167. Wasserman and Robinson, supra note 157, at 106-109.
168. H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, supra note 160, at 165 (1966) (emphasis original). Reed casts
the theory in a slightly different form:
The legal ideal posits both a rational man and an individual actor. Research and observations
of aspects of the trial point to the converse. Extraneous matters vie with the evidence for
the jury's deliberating time. Experimental and actual jury research indicate that only a
portion of the time spent in the jury room is given to discussion of the facts or evidence
in the case. Most of the time is spent talking about trial functionaries or matters wholly
foreign to the trial. Voting, on the other hand, is supposed to be determined by the facts
or the evidence in the case. Civilly the measure is "preponderance"; criminally, "beyond
a reasonable doubt". Both measures, however, create "gaps" between the evidence and the
verdict, which makes it feasible for the juror to vote his values rather than those of the
legal or politico-legal system.
Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting and Verdict Trends, 45 S.W. Soc. Sci. Q. 361, 370 (1965).
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would rather not have present in the process. Where we find racism,
class prejudice, sexism and the like, fidelity to the theory of trials
obligates us to root them out.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Is the Present System Up to the Task of Dealing with the
Biases and Prejudices of Our Time?
An example of quiet prejudice
Milas Martin, a 31-year old 69 factory hand at the former Volk-
swagen plant in South Charleston, West Virginia, died on a Charles-
ton Area Medical Center x-ray table while undergoing an intravenous
pyelogram.170 Mr. Martin, a sufferer from diabetes mellitus, had an
acute anaphylactoid reaction 7' to the dye injected during the pye-
logram.
Mr. Martin's widow sued. Her expert witness testified that the
economic loss alone to the family was between $768,000 and
$865,000. The widow also asked for non-economic damages for the
loss of her husband and the loss of their children's father.
The jury returned a damage award of less than a third of the
damages, $250,000.
Why was the Martin verdict so low? Was it because Mr. Martin
was black and the jury entirely white? 172 Why did another jury in
the same term, drawn from the same venire, return a verdict close
to million dollars for another wrongful death plaintiff? Was it be-
cause that plaintiff was white? 7 1
169. Most of the facts concerning Milas Martin and his injury are taken from Martin v. Charles-
ton Area Medical Center, 382 S.E.2d 502 (W. Va. 1989). Martin's age was reported in an interview
with Barry Hill, Mr. Martin's attorney (July 27, 1989).
170. A roentgenogram of the ureter and renal pelvis. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1424 (1981).
171. An anaphylactic shock is a severe allergic reaction resulting from the injection of substance
to which a person has been sensitized. Id. at 80.
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The irrelevancy of cause challenges
On voir dire, all the Martin jurors swore to be fair to the parties.
174
The jurors were probably all sincere people who took the juror's
oath seriously. 175 Did racism, however, subtly infect the jury's de-
cision?
None of the jurors was disqualified on the basis of cause, as
that term is described in Part I of this article, 176 nor was any dis-
qualified for favor on the grounds that the juror could not be fair
to blacks. 177 The West Virginia Supreme Court, when the case reached
it, reversed the jury's verdict as inadequate and sent the case back
to be re-tried. In doing so, the court bluntly stated that its decision
was "informed to some extent by the fact that the plaintiff is a
black woman suing for the death of a black husband and father on
behalf of herself and four black children."' 178 Then, citing Chin and
Peterson, 179 the court went on to say that in "cases of this type
involving white plaintiffs," the awards "are substantially higher....
In short, it is well documented that some jury awards are affected
by the race of the plaintiff." 10 The Martin case is anecdotal evidence
that, sadly enough, the racism that exists in other parts of our coun-
try is also at work in West Virginia juries. It is also anecdotal ev-
idence that our voir dire practices must be improved. The old
categories of cause challenges, handed down to us from the time of
174. Strangely enough, there appears to be no explicit requirement in the W. VA. CODE that
jurors be sworn. As pointed out to the author by Richard Rosswurm of the West Virginia Supreme
Court Administrator's Office, a number of provisions do, however, imply such a requirement. See,
e.g., W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12, 56-6-12(a), and 56-6-16 (1966). Telephone interview with Richard Ros-
swurm, West Virginia Supreme Court Administrator's Office (August 10, 1989).
The oath given in Monongalia County Circuit Court is illustrative of the oaths given throughout
the state. The juror must swear or affirm that he or she will "well and truly try the matters in issue
and a true verdict render according to the law and evidence." L. STARCHER & F. DnPoND, A HAND-
BOOK OF INFORMATION FOR TRIAL JuRoRs, 7-8.
175. Indeed, the plaintiffs lawyers did not voir dire on the race question because they wanted
to credit the jurors with fairness and because they did not believe that racist jurors would admit to
racism in public. Interview with Barry Hill, supra note 169.
176. DiSalvo, Gaining Access to the Jury: A Critical Guide to the Law Selection in West Virginia,
Part I: A Survey of the Law of Challenges, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 217, 224-26 (1988-89).
177. Interview with Barry Hill, supra note 169.
178. Martin, 382 S.E.2d at 506.
179. Chin and Peterson, supra note 126.
180. Martin, 382 S.E.2d at 506.
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Blackstone, are wholly inadequate for dealing with racism, sexism,
class prejudice, and the like. Recall the common law grounds for
cause challenges:
-kinship
-service as an arbitrator for either party
-interest in the cause
-an action pending between a juror and a party
-the juror has taken money for his verdict
-the juror was formerly a juror in the same case
-the juror is the party's master, servant, counselor, steward or
attorney or of the same society or corporation
-the juror is a member of the law enforcement community.'
None of these grounds have any direct or useful connection with
the types of bias and prejudice with which we are concerned here.
The practical constraints on the intelligent exercise of favor chal-
lenges
In theory, jurors plagued with racism, classism, sexism, or like
prejudices and biases will be removed on the basis of favor. 8 2 In-
deed, the controlling statute requires that no juror be "sensible of
any bias and prejudice.' ' 83 Unfortunately, a number of factors con-
spire to make it the exception rather than the rule that jurors car-
rying modern social biases and prejudices will be removed.
First, many judges refuse to allow lawyers any latitude in ques-
tioning jurors about social issues, such as racism, sexism, and class
181. State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917), discussed in DiSalvo, supra note
176, at 228-48. These are in addition to the statutory grounds for cause challenges, which themselves
are equally irrelevant. See DiSalvo, supra note 176, at 226-28.
182. The grounds for favor challenges are reviewed at DiSalvo, supra note 176, at 250-61.
183. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966).
[Vol. 92
38
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/6
JURY SELECTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
prejudice, 84 This is particularly true in those cases in which there
are no special circumstances making such an inquiry conspicuously
necessary.85 In the typical case judges usually confine lawyers to
the narrow bounds of cause challenges and a narrowly understood
range of favor grounds. Indeed, without a substantial change in his
or her thinking, it would be a radical departure for any trial judge
to allow lawyers to test social attitudes. 186 Many would recoil at the
thought of a lawyer in a routine personal injury case, for example,
using open-ended questions to probe a male juror's attitudes toward
women. Without being aware of the prejudice men have been proven
to have against women litigants in such situations, the court would
be justified in believing such questioning is a waste of judicial re-
sources,
A second problem arises from the tradition of judge-dominated
questioning that adheres in some of our courts. The problem is that
even if judges were disposed to question jurors about their social
attitudes, jurors are not likely to tell the court the truth. The judge
sits as the courtroom's pre-eminent authority figure. The judge rep-
resents the best ideals of our society, among them equality before
the law. When a judge questions a juror about the juror's ability
to be fair, the juror, consciously or not, reacts to a need to give
the socially acceptable answer to the black-robed judge. 8 7 So, for
example, when a judge asks a white juror whether the juror can be
184. Psychologists who have studied actual trial data report that judges in cases with black
defendants "were more likely to accept [voir dire] questions [submitted by defense attorneys] that
bore directly on the law and legal issues, and they tended to reject questions that dealt with more
general experiences prospective jurors had with blacks. Furthermore, the law-related questions were
most often posed in a close-ended way, for example, "Do you realize that the presumption of in-
nocence applies to a black defendant as well as to a white defendant?" whereas the more general
questions were more likely to be open-ended, for example, "How would you describe your experience
with black people at your job?" Thus, judges tended to reject open-ended questions, and those that
dealt with matters outside the courtroom," Hans, The Conduct of VoirDire: A Psychological Analysis,
II JusT. Sys. J. 40, 54 (1986).
185. This is not to imply that due process should not require such questioning under certain
circumstances, Again, this Article does not address the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court on when such questioning may sometimes be required. See supra note I.
186. "The average judge's idea of voir dire is just to ask, 'Can you be fair?' Once the prospective
juror has answered 'Yes,' everything else is considered irrelevant and the judge passes on to the next
juror ..... " Garry, Attacking Racism in Court Before Trial, MInmzNo RACisbi IN JuRy TRIALS xxii
(1969).
187, Vinson, Juror Bias, Are Present Legal Remedies Enough?, 9 TmAL Dn'L. J. 19, 24 (1986).
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fair to a black criminal defendant, even the most prejudiced juror
will likely say "yes."' 88
A recent experimental study conducted by Jones, 189 employing
realistic test conditions, demonstrates this point. Jones' data con-
firms the hypothesis that "jurors who [are] interviewed by a judge
... remain in states of relative heightened public self-awareness"
that "cause their self-reports of attitudes and beliefs to differ con-
siderably from their privately held attitudes and beliefs." 190 Jones
found that jurors were "considerably more candid in disclosing their
attitudes and beliefs about ... important topics during an attorney-
conducted voir dire.... [D]uring a judge-conducted voir dire jurors
attempted to report not what they truly thought or felt about an
issue, but instead what they thought the judge wanted to hear." 19'
Jones' conclusion was that "there may be implicit pressures in the
courtroom toward conformity to a 'perceived standard' that differs
depending on who conducts the voir dire."' 92
Third, when lawyers are allowed to question at all, they must
question the jurors, absent some special circumstance,1 93 in a public
setting, before their fellow jurors. This is ineffective for one of the
same reasons judge-questioning is ineffective-the juror senses he
or she is on trial before his or her peers and attempts to give the
socially acceptable answer. 94 The formal, ritualistic atmosphere of
188. "Evidence suggests that jurors with clearly defined biases continue to protest that they can
be fair." Id. at 20. Of course, a trial court should not be satisfied with the mere denial of prejudice
when there is the suggestion "of the probability of bias." Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace,
560 P.2d 262, 266 (Or. 1977), quoted with approval in West Virginia Department of Highways v.
Fisher, 289 S.E.2d 213, 219 (W. Va. 1982). See also, State v. Williams, 160 W. Va. 19, 26, 230
S.E.2d 742, 747 (1976), "The trial court is charged with ascertaining in the first instance whether
there is bias or prejudice on the part of the juror and, although the opinion of the juror is entitled
to consideration, it should not be taken as conclusive." One would suspect the Williams rule to be
honored principally in the breach.
189. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 11 LAw & HutA. BEaAv. 131 (1987).
190. Id. at 134.
191. Id. at 143.
192. Id. (Emphasis added). In accord with Jones' findings are those reported by Vidmar &
Melnitzer, Juror Prejudice: An Empirical Study of a Challenge for Cause, 22 OsGOODa HA aL L.J.
488 (1984).
193. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
194. [I]t is important to understand the forces of conformity acting on each of the
prospective jurors. They are thrust into an unfamiliar environment with a group of strangers
[Vol. 92
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the courtroom probably contributes to this reluctance to be forth-
coming with one's true feelings.195
The ineffectiveness of public questioning was amply demon-
strated in State v Dean.196 (Dean and Martin are the only West Vir-
ginia cases of which the author is aware in which jury verdicts were
overturned on the basis of juror racism.) In Dean, all twenty jurors
were asked, as a group, "whether or not [they] were biased in favor
of or prejudiced against the members of the Negro race?" Juror
Clifford Burns sat in stony silence in response to that question. After
the black defendant was convicted, Burns was heard to voice his
true prejudicial feelings about blacks in a rather different setting-
a bar. It is socially acceptable to announce one's racist views in
bars, but not in front of a judge or other jurors. Despite the wide-
spread incidence of racism, sexism, and class prejudice, it simply is
not socially acceptable to publicly claim such outlooks on life.
The fact is that jurors are more truthful when questioned in-
dividually and privately. 197 A 1982 study of actual trials in Kentucky
state courts by Nietzel and Dillehay'9 demonstrated that "individual,
sequestered voir dire ... permit[s] a fuller disclosure of juror bias."' 99
and may well be threatened by it. Such a situation will tend to elicit conformity on the
part of each juror (citation omitted); especially in a threatening situation, it is unlikely that
a juror will reveal his or her true feelings when a group question is asked of an entire
venire. Similarly, it is not likely that a juror will discredit himself or herself when asked
a direct question in front of other people. Also, whenever jurors observe the voir dire of
others, they become educated as to the "appropriate" responses. Thus, conducting the voir
dire as a group process will tend to exert social pressures on the prospective jurors to give
socially desirable responses.
Elwork, Sales, & Suggs, The Trial: A Research Review, THE TRA. PROCESS (1981).
Vidmar and Melnitzer concur and provide an additional reason jurors are not forthcoming with
the truth in public settings: "[a]n admission of prejudice may be perceived as an admission of weakness
of character, especially when the other panelists. . .give the appearance of not holding biases against
the accused." Vidmar & Melnitzer, supra note 192, at 510.
195. See Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56
IND. L.J. 245, 264 (1981).
196. 130 W. Va. 257, 58 S.E.2d 860 (1960).
197. An attorney for the plaintiff in Martin states that had he the right to conduct individual,
in-chambers voir dire he may very well have decided to squarely confront the race issue. Interview
with Hill, supra note 169.
198. Nietzel & Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir Dire Procedures in Capital Murder
Trials, 6 LAw & HUm. BEHAv. 1 (1982).
199. Id. at 10.
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These researchers found a marked difference resulting from in-cham-
bers voir dire: "When attorneys pose questions carefully tailored to
specific jurors the resulting dialogues are richly revealing relative to
the yield in open court, even when the judge permits questions put
to individuals.' '20
Fourth, it is often the case that when lawyers are successful in
coaxing individual jurors to admit bias or prejudice, judges then
intervene by cross-examining the juror in an effort to lead the juror
into saying that he or she can actually judge the case on the law
and evidence alone. This is nothing short of exploiting the judge's
status in the courtroom in order to put words in the juror's mouth
that will appear in the appellate record to meet the technical stan-
dards. 201 Although the case did not involve social bias or prejudice,
the trial court's questioning in State v. Bennett20 is illustrative of
the type of leading on voir dire in which judges often engage. The
juror in Bennett indicated that the community was "pretty much
against" the defendant and that the defendant was more likely to
have committed the crime of which he was accused than not.203 The
trial court intervened, as recounted by the Supreme Court:
Even though you think he's probably more guilty than he is innocent, you've
got to put that out of your mind. Can you do that?" [The juror's] response was
"Yeah." Again, at the conclusion of this questioning, the judge asked [the juror],
"I know you don't want to serve on this jury, and I understand that, but so-
meone's got to serve. If you have to serve will you be fair?", to which [the juror]
answered, "I'll do my best." [The judge] then asked "Can you be fair?", and
[the juror] said "Yeah." ' -
200. Id. Professor Lawrence Wrightsman, in his work, PSYCHOLOGY & THE LEGAL Sys. concurs:
After all, just how effective in unearthing bias is a directive, posed to 12 or 28 prospective
jurors sitting together in a jury box, to "raise your hand if you feel that you are prejudiced
against black people and that that would stand in your way of being fair in this case?"
In a group setting, few people will acknowledge socially unacceptable feelings. Rather, one
offers whatever is the socially correct way to respond, A more open-ended sort of ques-
tioning in the judge's chambers will be more revealing. It also keeps jurors from witnessing
their predecessors' responses and rehearsing their own.
Wrightsman, PsYcnOLOGY & THE LEGAL Sys. 244 (1987) (emphasis added).
See also, Vinson, The Biased Juror 14 Tm Ba F 22, 27
201. See DiSalvo, supra note 176, at 249.
202. No. 18540 (W. Va. June 15, 1989).
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 3. For another example in which the prospective's opinions about his ability to be
fair were bounced around the courtroom like a ping-pong ball by counsel and the trial court alike,
see State v. Perdue, 372 S.E.2d 636 (1988).
[Vol. 92
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Intervention of this sort, all too common in trial courts, makes
it difficult for lawyers to effectively challenge bias and prejudice.
25
For all these reasons, favor challenges are ineffective against
modern bias and prejudice without certain changes in the manner
in which voir dire is conducted. It is to those changes I now turn.
B. Getting Serious About Empaneling Fair Juries
The previous discussion makes it apparent that serious changes
in voir dire practice are necessary to ferret out modern biases and
prejudices. First, because jurors are more truthful about their biases
and prejudices with lawyers than with judges, lawyers must be al-
lowed to conduct voir dire. Second, because jurors are less truthful
in public than in private, questioning in chambers must be the rule
rather than the exception. 20 6 Third, because modern biases and prej-
udices cannot be discovered by simply asking jurors close-ended
questions (e.g., "Can you decide the case on the law and evidence
alone?"), judges must re-tool their understanding of favor challenges
and allow the broader, open-ended questioning necessary to elicit
205. The courts also signal the correct answers to jurors, even when there has been no expression
of unease by the juror, by using close-ended questions.
Zymewski v. Sluss, No. 78-453 (Kanawha County Cir. Ct. 1978), was a civil action for damages
growing out of a rape. The questioning of a prospective juror by the court in that case is illustrative
of how a judge's language leads jurors, whether they are prejudiced or not, to the correct answer:
THE COURT: All right now, if in this case the evidence were to show that the plaintiff
is a white woman, and if the evidence in the case where to show she was raped by a black
man, would that circumstance standing alone make it difficult or impossible for you to
decide this case in accordance with all the evidence and in accordance with the law of the
case given you by the Court? First I will ask you if you understand the question.
JUROR: You are asking me if I would be quicker to condemn a colored man than a white
man?? Is that what your question is?
THE COURT: That may be part of it, but would the matter standing alone, just because
the evidence would show it was a black man, if it were, and the woman was a white woman,
would that fact alone cause you any difficulty or prejudice or feelings in the case, in hearing
the case?
JUROR: I don't think so, because a wrong is a wrong, whether it is done by black, white,
red or yellow. That is the way I look at it. It doesn't make any difference if a person is
red or black or white, if the evidence shows they did wrong, I don't think I would go any
quicker against a colored man than I would a white man for the same wrong.
Transcript of individual voir dire. Id. at 6-7.
206. Voir dire, of course, cannot be completely closed. While other prospective jurors may be
excluded from the questioning, the public cannot. See Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501 (1984). See also supra note 17.
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information to support favor challenges on the basis of racism, sex-
ism, classism, and the like.207
The West Virginia Legislature should enact voir dire legislation
to remedy this situation.208 As an alternative to legislation, the West
Virginia Supreme Court should amend our rules of civil and criminal
procedure, effecting these proposed changes. In either case, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals should urge the circuit courts to exercise
their discretion by allowing attorneys to pursue lines of open-ended
voir dire questions designed to test for the presence of racism, sex-
ism, classism, and the like. Such questioning should be allowed in
all cases, for biases and prejudices exist not only in the obvious
cases, such as in Martin, but also in garden variety cases, such as
automobile injury actions.20 9
The proposal advanced here to secure by statute the right to
attorney-conducted, individual, in-chambers voir dire will undoubt-
edly resurrect criticisms of attorney-conducted voir dire that have
been raised before. 210 Rather than fully re-create here the debate over
207. What Professors Bastress and Harbaugh have said about client interviewing is equally ap-
plicable to interviewing of jurors:
The primary means of obtaining information during the ... interview is the posing of a
series of questions to the client. Questions, however, can be of various types, each type
having a different goal. Your inquiries can be broad or narrow, leading or nonleading. In
this stage of the interview, you should prefer broad questions to narrow ones, nonleading
ones to leading ones. Since your goal in the initial client interview (and many follow-up
interviews) is to obtain information from the client's perspective,.. you should avoid taint-
ing the product with narrow, leading questions .... Leading questions obviously exert the
most stringent interviewer control. They therefore are most useful when you seek to maintain
the maximum amount of control over what is said.
R. Bastress and J. Harbaugh, Interpersonal Skills for Lawyers: Interviewing, Counseling and Ne-
gotiation 205, 349 (unpublished manuscript). See also R. GORDEN, IrNTERVIEWINo 350-353 (1975).
208. A bill sponsored by Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama calls for establishing a right to
attorney-conducted voir dire in the federal courts. S. 591 and S. 592. See Heflin, Let Lawyers Ask
the Questions, A.B.A. J. 14, 20 (November 1984). See also Moore, Lawyers Split Over Voir Dire
Procedure, 13 LrIoATION NEws 5, No. 3 (February 1988).
209. See Cim AND PETERSON, DEEP PoccETs, EaPTY PocKETs: WHO WiNs IN COOK COUNTY
JURY TRIAls (1985).
For alternatives to the proposal advanced here, see Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum
Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493 (1975) (urging
courts to presume prejudice under certain circumstances where it is not now presumed and suggesting
procedural guidelines) and Note, Juror Bias-a Practical Screening Device and the Case for Permitting
its Use, 64 MINN. L. R-v. 987 (1980) (suggesting use of attitudinal questionnaires).
210. For reviews of these arguments, see Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted
[Vol. 92
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these criticisms that occurred in the '70s and early '80s, allow me
to summarize the criticisms and the responses that discredited them.21'
The criticisms fell into two broad categories. The first was that
voir dire was being exploited by lawyers for reasons unattached to
the purposes for which voir dire was designed. A 1973 decision of
the Supreme Court of California accurately reflects this criticism:
Such examination is not for the purpose of determining the exercise of per-
emptory challenges.... Neither is it the function of the examination of pro-
spective jurors to educate the jury panel to particular facts of the case, to compel
the jurors to vote a certain way, to prejudice the jury for or against a certain
party, to argue the case, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.
2
12
The court claimed lawyers were employing voir dire "as a ploy
to gain tactical advantage," with a view toward securing a jury that
would be "more fair to one side than the other. ' 213 The only true
purpose of voir dire, according to the Court, is "to weed out un-
suitable jurors.''214
The second criticism was of the "inordinate time consumed in
the process of selection of jurors. ' 215 Lawyers were accused of ask-
ing "tedious and time-wasting questions, which are seemingly in-
terminable and repetitious. ... ",216 Then-Chief Justice Warren Burger
to Ensure That Our Juries are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGs L.Q. 65 (1976), and Note,
The Need for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire in New Jersey Capital Cases, 36 RurTGEgs L. REv. 915,
925-27 (1984).
211. See, e.g., Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving Its Wonderful Power, 27 STAN. L. REv. 545
(1975). See also, Padawer, Singer, & Singer, Voir Dire By Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57
JuDmcATuRE 9 (1974).
212. People v. Crowe, 100 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375, 506 P.2d 193, 199, (1973) (quoting Rousseau
v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 882, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1967)).
By contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court has never wavered in its belief that one of the
principal purposes of voir dire is to provide information for the intelligent exercise of peremptory
challenges. See State v. Pendry, 159 W. Va. 738, 746, 227 S.E.2d 210, 217 (1976), overruled on other
grounds, Jones v. Warden, West Virginia Penitentiary, 161 W. Va. 168, 241 S.E.2d 914 (1978).
213. Crowe, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 506 P.2d at 200.
214. Id. at 371, 506 P.2d at 195. Apparently this weeding out was to be done with a greater,
perhaps exclusive, emphasis on cause and favor challenges since it is more difficult to exercise per-
emptory challenges intelligently without lawyer voir dire than with it.
215. Id. at 375, 506 P.2d at 199.
216. Id. at 376, 506 P.2d at 200.
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used hyperbole to complain that voir dire had "become in itself a
major piece of litigation consuming days or weeks. ' 217
The accusations that lawyers have attempted to manipulate voir
dire opportunities to educate jurors about the case, to establish rap-
port with the jurors, and to persuade the jurors to the lawyer's point
of view may, in the main, have been justified, if somewhat exag-
gerated. Fears about the abuse of voir dire for advocacy purposes
are greatly lessened, if not completely extinguished, however, by the
regulatory power of the trial court. Like other areas in which lawyer
zealousness is exhibited, there is a ready cure in the intervention
power of the court. When a lawyer steps over the legitimate bound-
aries of opening statement, witness examination or closing argument,
there is always a lawyer on the other side all too eager to invoke
the court's assistance in halting the offensive conduct. The same is
true of voir dire. Opposing counsel is there to blow the whistle. In
many instances the presence of such opposing counsel is superfluous
as many judges do not need an invitation to intervene, but instead
take primary and direct responsibility for policing the conduct of
lawyers in their courtrooms.
Moreover, those who oppose lawyer-conducted voir dire on the
grounds that lawyers will abuse it do not evince much understanding
of West Virginia practice. With the great majority of litigation in
West Virginia involving practitioners who appear over and over be-
fore the same judges, West Virginia lawyers have every incentive to
comply with the desires of trial courts in this area.
One final comment with regard to advocacy on voir dire is in
order. Is it not perfectly proper, and, indeed, commendable, that
a lawyer on voir dire should ask questions that, in effect, advocate
that jurors not discriminate on the basis of race, class, gender, or
attractiveness? Opposition to advocacy on this point shows a lack
of sensitivity to the ultimate goal of fairness.
With respect to the criticism that attorney-conducted voir dire
is inefficient, I must first point out that it has not been conclusively
217. Remarks of Chief Justice Burger to the National Conference on the Judiciary, Williamsburg,
Va., as quoted by Van Dyke, supra note 210, at 83. As Professor Van Dyke points out, Justice
Burger's remarks constituted an over-reaction to a few major political trials of the time. Id.
[Vol. 92
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demonstrated that lawyer-conducted voir dire is in fact more time-
consuming than judge-conducted voir dire.28 The fear that many of
us have that lawyer-conducted voir dire is more time-consuming,
however, is not irrational. We have read about the few cases to
which Justice Burger alluded. Judges who are concerned about the
costs of delay and crowded condition of their calendars have a par-
ticular right to be concerned. 219
Is there a way to achieve the virtues of lawyer-conducted, in-
dividual, in-chambers voir dire and still achieve some efficiencies?
One method that immediately springs to mind is to construct the
right so that it does not obtain in every case, but only in those cases
in which it is relevant. With respect to race, this might be easy to
do by simply reserving the right to those situations in which there
is a minority litigant or defendant. The biases and prejudices that
are associated with socioeconomics and gender, however, are pres-
ent, in varying degrees, in almost all cases. Accordingly, an attempt
to restrict the right to relevant cases would be equivalent to defining
a set that includes virtually the entire universe of cases.
A second alternative would be to confine the right to cases in
which the biases and prejudices are particularly acute. This solution,
however, poses insurmountable definitional problems. Courts cannot
even agree on the acuteness of prejudice in the relatively easy sit-
uation of a minority defendant-white jury.20 One can imagine the
disagreement that might attend a judgment on attractiveness/un-
attractiveness. The most appealing alternative, though certainly not
a perfect one, is one that provides each litigant with the right to
individual, in-chambers, lawyer-conducted voir dire for a limited
period of time. In this respect, the proposal of Senator Howell He-
flin of Alabama to provide thirty minutes per litigant for lawyer-
218. After examining the findings of 18 different voir dire time studies, Professor Jon Van Dyke
concluded that "the evidence does not indicate conclusively that any of the systems is necessarily less
time-consuming." Id. at 88.
219. "[V]e have never held that in camera individual voir dire is required (citation omitted).
An inflexible rule of mandatory in camera individual voir dire would quickly grind this State's criminal
justice machinery to a halt." State v. Lassiter, 354 S.E.2d 595, 600 (W. Va. 1987). Accord, State v.
Mayle, 357 S.E.2d 219 fV. Va. 1987).
220. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
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conducted voir dire in the federal courts is intriguing. 221 While thirty
minutes may not be fully adequate to perform questioning under
optimal conditions, it would allow for either brief questioning of
all jurors or the questioning of selected jurors who might be most
likely to harbor biases and prejudices. To provide for cases in which
the bias and prejudice issues may be acute, the trial court ought to
be given the discretion to lengthen the time allowed upon a showing
of particularized need.
In exercising their discretion under this proposed statute, our trial
courts will surely keep in mind that efficiency is not the exclusive
goal of the court system. 2  If the West Virginia Supreme Court's
opinion in Pendry is indicative, it is not the tradition in this state
to crown speed at the cost of fairness:
The criticism most frequently voiced by those who would restrict voir dire ex-
amination is that it is time-consuming. It is true that the time of the court and
all parties is important. However, the efficient utilization of time does not require
any sacrifice of procedures which are calculated to assure that ... a jury [is]
free from any taint .....
221. See supra note 7. Senator Heflin's proposal only calls for lawyer-conducted voir dire. It
does not establish a right to individual, in-chambers voir dire.
The text of S. 591 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
is amended to read as follows:
(a) EXAMINATION.-Upon the request of the defendant or the Government, the
court shall permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the Government each
a minimum of 30 minutes to conduct an oral examination of the prospective jury. Additional
time for examination by the attorneys may be provided at the court's discretion, and the
court may, in addition to such examination, conduct its own examination. The court shall
have authority to impose reasonable limitations with respect to the questions allowed during
such voir dire examination. In a case in which there are multiple defendants, each side shall
have an additional 10 minutes for each additional defendant, except that the total time
required to be allowed shall not exceed one hour per side.
S. 591 101st CONG., 1st Sass., 135 CONG. 2706 (1989)
S. 592, which amends FRCP 47(a), is virtually identical.
222. If, upon adoption, the proposal made here is found to cause the removal of more jurors
than were removed under the previous practice, we may find the costs of the jury system increasing
modestly as larger panels are initially called.
223. State v. Pendry, 159 W. Va. 738, 747, 227 S.E.2d 210, 217 (1976). See also, State v. Van
Metre, 342 S.E.2d 450, 452 (V. Va. 1986) ("When the demands for fair procedure conflict with the
desirable public policy of economy of effort and money, fair procedure prevails").
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The right to lawyer-conducted voir dire in chambers should be
recognized as just such a procedural right.224 The hypothesized dis-
advantages of lawyer-conducted, individual, in-chambers voir dire
are ultimately trivial and petty when cast against the importance of
the cherished democratic theories that support the institution of trial
by jury. As the body best able to give life to these theories, the
legal community is obligated to provide each litigant with a jury
that conforms to the ideals of a tabula rasa and systemic neutrality
as closely as possible.
The legal community will cast aside the troubling news reported
here about juror bias and prejudice, and the failure of our current
system to deal with it, at great risk to these ideals. Failure to address
the operation of bias and prejudice in our jury system will not only
mean that injustices will be visited upon individual litigants, but it
will also spawn a lack of faith in the system among the citizenry
at large.
We can have fairer and more upright juries. We can eliminate
cases like Martin from our system. We can do so, however, only
by boldly breaking from a past that has failed us and embracing a
future that promises justice to all of our citizens, regardless of
whether they are male or female, wealthy or impoverished, beautiful
or plain, black or white.
224. Compare, Note, Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HAv. L.
REv. 1472, 1584 (1988).
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